Gulf Research Center
Knowledge for All

GLMM
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration

# Measuring the impact of Covid-19 on migrant workers in the GCC and Jordan

## Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population

GLMM - RR - No. 1 / 2023

RESEARCH REPORT

**Support:** The Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population (GLMM) programme has received support from the International Migration Initiative (IMI) of the Open Society Foundations (OSF) and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC). It has obtained research funding from the National Priorities Research Program (NPRP) of the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF). It also obtained research contracts from UNDP Kuwait and the ILO Regional office for the Arab States (ROAS, Beirut). It also relies on the institutional resources of the GLMM and GRC.

# Measuring the impact of Covid-19 on migrant workers in the GCC and Jordan

**Françoise De Bel-Air**

**Abstract**
The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are among the largest recipients of immigrants worldwide, while Jordan is both a country of emigration and a country of immigration. However, up-to-date, comprehensive, and detailed estimates of stocks and flows of international migrants and international work migrants in, to and from Jordan and the six GCC states, are hard to come by.

The report seeks to bridge this gap and inform readers of existing migration statistics for mapping migrants' stocks, flows and socioeconomic information pertaining to employment patterns in each of the six Gulf states and Jordan. Based on these data, the report also explores the impact of the COVID-19-related health and economic crises on foreign migrants in the region. A particular focus is put on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, with Ethiopia and Kenya as specific case studies.

After briefly reviewing the statistical sources available on international and work migration in the seven countries, and their limitations (Section 1), Section 2 of the report provides a general quantitative and qualitative analysis of the main outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent economic downturn on migration stocks and flows. Section 3 assesses the differential migration and employment dynamics, at the level of single nationalities whenever possible, with a particular focus on migrant workers from sub-Saharan Africa. Section 4 examines the data available to assess the numbers of Kenyan and Ethiopian international migrant workers in the Gulf region, as well as figures of return of these nationals from the Gulf states to their home country, because of the Covid-19 crisis.

**Keywords**
Bahrain; Kuwait; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; United Arab Emirates; Jordan; Ethiopia; Kenya; Egypt; Syria; India; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Philippines; Sri Lanka; Nepal; Cameroon; Uganda; Tanzania; Asia; Arab Countries; Africa; Foreign & National Populations; National & Foreign Labour; Domestic Workers; Migration Policy; Statistics; Laws & Regulations; Nationalisation Work Force; Deportation; Low-Skilled Labour; Living Conditions; Residence Conditions; Work Conditions; Employment; Return to Country of Origin.

---

* This paper was originally written in the summer of 2021 (and last updated in September 2021) for the International Labour Organisation (ILO) FAIRWAY programme - https://www.ilo.org/beirut/projects/fairway/lang--en/index.htm. A shorter version of the paper was also prepared as a thematic brief for the virtual Africa-Arab States Tripartite Interregional Meeting on Labour Migration on 15-16 November 2021, co-hosted by the ILO and the African Union Commission (AUC). The opinions expressed in the paper do not reflect those of the ILO or its constituents, the AUC, or any other party, including GLMM and GRC. All errors rest with the author.

The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[1] countries are among the largest recipients of immigrants worldwide: they hosted 11 per cent of the world's total migrant stock in 2019.[2] The 30 million foreign migrants in the region in 2019, made up more than half (52 percent) of the GCC total population. As many as 88 percent of residents in the State of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were immigrants.[3] Jordan is both a country of emigration (11 per cent of the country's national population have emigrated abroad) and a country of immigration. In 2019, 25 percent of the resident population were immigrants and 30.3 percent were refugees.[4]

The first cases of Covid-19 were recorded in early February 2020 in the Gulf states. Foreign migrants in the region were initially overrepresented among the Covid-19 cases, and probably deaths, at the start of the epidemic, in Saudi Arabia,[5] Oman,[6] and Kuwait.[7] On the economic side, lockdowns to control the spread of the epidemic, the break in touristic activities and the steep drop in oil prices precipitated all GCC countries and Jordan into economic recession. There again, when compared with receiving countries' nationals, migrants have been disproportionately affected by salary cuts, unpaid leaves, and layoffs resulting from the downturn. In this context, many expatriates were expected to leave the Gulf states and Jordan.

However, up-to-date, comprehensive, and detailed estimates of stocks and flows of international migrants and international work migrants[8] in, to and from Jordan and the six GCC states, are hard to come by. The report seeks to bridge this gap and inform readers of existing migration statistics for mapping migrants' stocks, flows and socioeconomic information pertaining to employment patterns in each of the six Gulf states and Jordan. A particular focus is put on identifying sources of data on sub-Saharan African migrants in the region. Immigration of these nationals to the Gulf region and Jordan is relatively recent, and their numbers are low in comparison to those of migrants from Asia, for instance. Moreover, many of these nationals are women, and are employed in the domestic sector, which is less documented in statistics than the private and governmental employment sectors. Therefore, little is known on these populations. Ethiopia and Kenya were chosen as specific case studies. Ethiopia is indeed one of the most populated countries in Africa. It was also the first sub-Saharan country to send migrants to the Middle East. Moreover, Ethiopian nationals have been particularly singled out in Gulf host countries during the police campaigns launched against migrants in irregular administrative situations (i.e., have overstayed their visa; entered on Umrah or Hajj visas and work without labour permit, etc.) in several countries of the region since 2010. Kenyan migrants are also among the most numerous sub-Saharan African nationals in the region. Moreover, the Kenyan government has developed a Diaspora Policy,[9] identified as one of the Kenya Vision 2030 flagship projects, which emphasizes the need to sustain links with Kenyan emigrants to enhance the country's development process. The country has also put in place an overseas recruitment policy and dedicated apparatus. This includes several bilateral labour agreements with Gulf states and Jordan,[10] as well as a policy to protect the interests of Kenyan nationals abroad.[11]

Section 1 of the report will briefly review the statistical sources available on international migration and work migration in the seven countries, and their limitations. Section 2 of the report provides a general quantitative and qualitative analysis of the main outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent economic downturn on migration stocks and flows. Section 3 assesses the differential migration and employment dynamics at the level of the groups of countries of origin (Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Arab states…), or at the level of single nationalities whenever possible, with a particular focus on migrant workers from sub-Saharan Africa. Section 4 examines the data available to assess the numbers of Kenyan and Ethiopian international migrants or international migrant workers in the Gulf region, as well as figures of returns of these nationals from the Gulf states to their home countries, because of the Covid-19 crisis.

## 1. Migration data available in the Gulf states and Jordan and their limitations

Measuring the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and subsequent economic crisis on work migrants in their destination countries, including their returns to their home state, requires access to the following statistics:

STOCKS

- Changes in total/employed international migrants' stocks
- Changes in stocks/distribution by relation to labour force (for example: from employed to unemployed, from employed to inactive, etc.)
- Changes in stocks between occupation categories (upgrading/downgrading of workforce.); activity sectors

(resulting from a drop in certain activity sectors' business, secondments of temporarily unemployed workers, etc.)

- Changes in stocks between categories of workers (employed to family dependent etc.)
- Changes of stocks by salary (range, hours of work, etc.)

FLOWS

- Net migration inflows/outflows at border posts (except transit travellers), by category of residence
- Job terminations, by reason for termination
- New entrants to labour market, by sector and other characteristics
- Issuances and renewals of entry visas; first permits (residency, labour)
- Issuances and renewals of labour permits by occupation, activity, sector, …
- Issuances and renewals of residency permit by type/purpose of permit (employment, family dependent, …)

RETURNS

- Changes in stocks of return migrants
- Changes in stocks of return workers (by country of previous labour attachment)
- Inflows of return migrants/ return migrant workers (by country of previous labour attachment, other characteristics).

The six countries in the region have set up functional statistical apparatuses, some as early as the 1940s (Bahrain) and the 1950s (Kuwait). In others such as Oman, the statistical experience is much more recent (the 1990s). However, the seven countries have now produced a significant corpus of statistics on population and labour. All seven countries have dedicated modern statistical apparatuses and have been conducting various surveys on a regular basis for more than a decade. These include labour force and household surveys. Within the realm of the "smart identity-cards" compulsory delivery programmes and building of centralised population registries conducted in the Gulf states since the mid-2000s,[12] administrative records have become more widely used, and are expected to provide more accurate population figures than population counts such as censuses. This was illustrated in the case of Kuwait, a pioneer in demographic data collection and dissemination since the inception in 1957 of the Central Statistical Office (CSO) within the Planning Ministry. The CSO conducts population and housing censuses. Yet, since 1995 a growing discrepancy was witnessed, between CSO data, and figures produced by the Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI), an independent government body in charge of 1- centralising all population and labour force data to manage a fully computerised population register and 2- issuing mandatory civil identification cards to every resident of the country. As the registration of events by PACI is fully computerised, it is thus likely that the Authority's data are accurate.[13] Bahrain, Qatar and Oman completed administrative records-based censuses in 2020, while Saudi Arabia's quarterly Labour Force Surveys have been based on survey, as well as administrative data since 2016. Only the UAE has a comparatively limited production of data. No census was conducted at the federal (country) level since 2005, and statistics disseminated by the Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Centre (FCSC) to the public, for instance labour data, are systematically presented as percentages for nationals and non-nationals separately and not as numbers. Therefore, the reprocessing of the data by users is impossible.

However, migration and labour migration-related data in the Gulf states and Jordan suffer from caveats of a more general nature. These limit, first, the comparability between Gulf and other regions' migration and labour migration data and second, the quantity and scope of data available on the topic of migration in these countries.

a. **Definition of international migrants and international migrant workers: non-compliance with UN and ILO definition.**

In Gulf countries and in Jordan, the definition of international migrant is citizenship-based. Naturalisations are almost inexistant.[14] In the seven countries, immigration is mostly linked to employment, and foreigners' sojourn is not meant to exceed the duration of their labour contract, i.e., be permanent or even long-term. Therefore, the very notion of immigration/immigrant (meaning: foreign nationals' settlement in the host state) is rejected by the seven countries. Expatriates are considered temporary contract workers, and are thus labelled "guests" or *wafidîn,*[15] referred to as "non-nationals" (non-Emirati; non-Jordanian). Although the seven countries usually abide by the definitions of concepts and classifications produced by international organisations, no definition exists of an international migrant in the methodological sections or manuals pertaining to population and labour statistics, even when detailed and precise like in Qatar.[16] Other countries such as Bahrain use the notion of "foreigner, expatriate", or "foreign worker".[17] Because it could imply long-term settlement, only a fraction of foreign migrants in Gulf states, therefore, have a right to bring their family members to stay with them on family residence permits (family reunion). Likewise, none of the seven countries are signatories to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and, thus, do not recognize "refugees" as a legal category,[18] for accepting refugees under international protection status would signify their long-term, or permanent settlement in the host state.[19]

This has several implications, as regards the concepts and definitions used in the Gulf states and Jordan to categorise migrants. Migration and labour migration figures produced in the region are not exactly comparable with those fitting international concepts and definitions produced by ILO, since the category of *"wafed*", pl. "*wafidin*" (guest labourer-s), or non-nationals is not consistent with the concept of *international migrant* as defined in the Guidelines set forth by the International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) of 2018, which "include[s] all those residents of a given country who have ever changed their country of usual residence" (§13).[20] Since the birth right for citizenship and maternal transmission of citizenship do not apply in these countries, a share of the foreign residents, born in these countries but not naturalised, are not "migrants" according to the ILO/ UN definition, which takes as a criterion the change of usual residence. Children of a foreign father and a national or a foreign mother, for instance, are unduly counted as migrants (non-nationals) and only children whose father is a natural born citizen can pass on citizenship to their offspring. Consequently, non-migrant foreigners can be many: 17 percent of all non-Kuwaitis, and as much as 70 percent of the foreign children aged below 15 residing in Kuwait in 2017 were actually born in the country.[21]

This issue also limits the scope of the migration-related data produced and disseminated to the public. The internationally recognised concept of "international migrant worker" applies to foreign migrants in the labour force, i.e., employed, and unemployed. However, since residency is linked to employment in Gulf states, and in Jordan to a lesser extent, foreign nationals are excluded from unemployment benefits, like in Saudi Arabia, and foreign workers' unemployment, for example, is usually not considered of interest. Most Gulf states (except Qatar) take "employed foreign workers", and not the labour force, as a category of reference in statistics. No data is available to the public on foreign workers' unemployment in Oman, or in Bahrain before the last census conducted in 2020, for instance. Others, like Jordan, have a non-discrimination policy on access to unemployment benefits. However, no or only rare data are published on this topic.

### b. Political sensitivity of migration data

Though Gulf states do not conceive of themselves as immigration countries, they host large shares of foreign (de facto) residents, which range between 38 percent in Saudi Arabia and 87-88 percent in the UAE and Qatar (Annexed Table 1). Due to the large size of migrant communities, or of individual foreign nationalities that may outnumber national populations, Gulf states rarely publish figures of migrants disaggregated by country of citizenship. Only Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman routinely release some estimates of foreign nationals by country of citizenship (usually a selection), or groups of countries of origin (Arab states, non-Arab Asia, non-Arab Africa, etc.). At the other end of the spectrum, modern and technologically advanced countries like Qatar and the UAE conceal population data essential to researchers and only release aggregated population figures (total population). Qatar only publishes disaggregated figures (nationals/ non-nationals) for the population aged 15 and above. Demographic statistics indeed hold political stakes, due to the "demographic imbalance" perceived in many of these countries. In several GCC states (Saudi Arabia for instance), the coexistence of high immigration levels and high unemployment rates among citizens, the youth especially, explains the shortage of detailed data on foreign workers.

Consequently, no country in the region proposes a set of data comprehensive enough to help researchers precisely measure the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on work migrants in the region, as listed at the beginning of the section. Returns to migrants' home states, here, Kenya and Ethiopia, are not recorded either by local authorities, except in sporadic official statements and one recent survey, which will be focused on in section 4. Therefore, in this report we use a limited set of data on stocks of international migrants and international migrant workers, with some disaggregation by activity, as well as permit data on migrants' stocks. These data are almost exclusively extracted from administrative records, which signifies that a large share of the labour migrants in the region (the workers in irregular administrative situations), are not accounted for. We use secondary sources to briefly document the situation of these populations. The UAE data are mostly in percentages format, which does not allow re-processing. The UAE will thus not be examined in depth in this section.

Using limited sets of data only available in Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait, as well as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to a lesser extent, we now examine the impact of the Covid-19 related crises on selected nationalities, with an emphasis, whenever possible, on sub-Saharan African migrants. Despite the existing divergences in the definition of international migrant and international migrant worker between international organisations and the seven countries examined here, in this report we refer to 1. "international migrants" and 2. "international migrant workers" to designate 1. foreign residents in the seven countries (workers + other categories of migrants) and 2. foreign workers.

## 2. Covid-19 related health and economic crises on migrants' stocks, flows and socioeconomic profile: General picture

### a. International migrants

As Gulf states, like most Arab states, make employment a condition of foreigners' residence, it was expected that large numbers of migrants would leave Gulf countries due to the Covid-19-induced economic downturn.[22] As of early 2021, S&P Ratings anticipated a 4 percent decrease in the size of total Gulf populations, with a population decline sharpest in Dubai, followed by Oman, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait.[23] Annexed Table 2 indeed confirms some of these forecasts. Oman lost 250,000 foreign residents between mid-2019 and mid-2021. In 2020 alone, around 280,000 immigrants left Oman between January and November, effectively decreasing the migrant population by 16 percent.[24] Kuwait lost about 130,000 foreign residents between December2019 and December 2020, a close to 4 percent decrease; Bahrain witnessed a 3 percent decline in the number of resident expatriates during the same period. The UAE population also declined in 2020 (Annexed Table 2). Dubai statistics,[25] however, did not record a drop in the number of foreign residents, which went up from 3,092,450 to 3,140,150 (end of years figures), despite numerous accounts of migrants' massive departures, following the wage cuts and layoffs in the Emirate.[26]

**Figure 1: Evolution of the foreign population growth rates by country (2015-2021)**




Sources: Author's calculations, based on the sources listed hereby: GCC countries: https://gulfmigration.grc.net/bahrain-gcc-pop-1-2-foreign-population-in-the-six-gcc-states-mid-year-figures-2000-2021/; https://gulfmigration.grc.net/gcc-total-populations-in-the-six-gcc-states-mid-year-figures-2000-2021/; Jordan: Ministry of Labour, National Labour Market Figures.

Consequently, foreign populations[27] declined everywhere[28] during 2020, except in Qatar and in Saudi Arabia (Figure 1). The positive growth rate of Saudi Arabia's foreign population, which gained 468,315 individuals between mid-2019 and mid-2020, comes as a surprise. The Saudi Ministry of Interior indeed stated that around 300,000 workers had left the Kingdom during the first semester of 2020, with 178,000 successful applications for *Awdah*, the government scheme to facilitate the departure of foreign workers to their countries of origin during the Covid-19 pandemic, processed between April 22 and June 3.[29] These departures should have decreased the resident foreign population by around 2.2 percent, in the absence of any massive inflow: the context of large-scale Saudization measures and tax and other fee implementations are not conducive to a significant increase in the number of expatriates coming to the country during 2019-2020. Figures of residency permits issued effectively declined by 13 percent between 2017 and 2019.[30] The relative stability of official migrant population figures growing at a rate above 3.5 percent annually, despite the specific circumstances of the period, confirms doubts expressed earlier regarding the accuracy of Saudi foreign population data.

This notwithstanding, the Covid-19 crisis did affect the size and dynamics of foreign populations in the other Gulf states, and presumably in Jordan.[31] However, as visible in Figure 1, the decline in the growth rates of foreign populations did not start with the Covid-19 crisis. It started earlier, in 2016 in Oman, in 2017 in Bahrain and as early as 2014 in Qatar. The numbers of foreign migrants started decreasing in 2017 in Oman and in Bahrain (Figure 1; Annexed Table 2). Even Saudi Arabia witnessed a contraction of the country's foreign population growth rates after 2014 and the oil prices decline. It is likely that large campaigns of deportation of workers in an irregular situation, as well as extensive measures of workforce nationalisation and limitation of the foreign workforce, especially in Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, added to a slower economic pace due to lower oil prices after 2014, had already affected foreign communities in Gulf states before the pandemic. In Qatar, the 2017 political crisis between the country and the other GCC states also led to a contraction of the economy which drove some migrant workers to leave the country.[32]

As indicated in Figure 2, evidence from Bahrain suggests that workers and family dependents did not depart immediately after the onset of the pandemic. They terminated their residency permits after the end of the confinement periods in Q3, but more workers than dependents left the country during Q4 of 2020. This may be explained by mobility constraints and border closures imposed on residents. It may also suggest that many families are settled in Bahrain and do not necessarily have elsewhere to go, while workers having migrated alone are more mobile. This should be confirmed by comparing the age and sex distribution of resident foreign populations before and after the pandemic.[33] Right after the beginning of the pandemic, renewals of permits picked up at the expense of new permits, for the two categories.

**Figure 2. Evolution of flows by type (termination, first issuance, renewal) and purpose (family dependent, worker) of permit by quarter (Bahrain, 2020).**




## b. International migrant workers

Stocks of workers decreased notably in the Gulf region, because of the Covid-19 crisis.[34] Numbers of workers[35] dipped everywhere between Q4 2019 and Q4 2020, although the decline had already started earlier in Oman and Saudi Arabia (Figure 3, Annexed Table 3). In Qatar, similarly, the number of employed migrant workers declined from 2,063,050 during Q1 of 2020, to 1,940,667 during Q1 of 2021. A similar figure had not been recorded since Q1 2016 (1,900,882).[36]

The decrease is acute in the private sector (Figure 4, Annexed Table 4), the major employer of the foreign workforce: during 2020,[37] sizeable numbers of migrant workers left their jobs in the private sector:

- Bahrain: 8 percent (-38,977 workers)
- Kuwait: 9 percent (-146,697 workers)
- Oman: 16 percent (-215,748 workers)
- Saudi Arabia: 4 percent (quarter of a million workers).

**Figures 3 and 4: Evolution of the stocks of employed foreign workers (all sectors, private sector) in selected countries**




Sources: Bahrain: Expatriate Management System (LMRA-EMS), General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), Pension Fund Commission (PFC), and Civil Service Bureau (CSB) monthly data files to LMRA; Kuwait: Integrated Database, Labour Market Information System, Central Statistical Bureau (CSB); Oman: Royal Oman Police in Monthly Statistical Bulletins; Saudi Arabia: General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (MHRSD), National Information Center (NIC), in Labour Force Surveys. The public sector includes those subject to civil service regulations and government employees subject to insurance regulations (GOSI). Data are for Q4 of every year.

In Saudi Arabia and Oman, however, the decline of the numbers of foreign workers in the private sector started in 2016, most likely due to a slashing of foreigners' recruitment in the private sector, in line with the toughening of the policies of labour nationalisation in the two countries.

Although it had been expanding until 2019, the number of domestic workers also went down during 2020.

- Kuwait: from 706,586 (Q4 2019) to 677,939 (Q4 2020), a 4 percent decrease;
- Saudi Arabia: from 3,690,719 (Q4 2019) to 3,663,939 (Q4 2020) (-27,000 employees in the sector);
- Oman: the number of registered domestic workers reached 252,681 at the end of 2020, a 14 percent dip (41,000 persons) from late 2019.[38]
- In Jordan, figures of labour permit holders suggest that the numbers of domestic workers contracted by a third, from 60,398 at the end of 2019 to 40,295 at the end of 2020.[39]

As was seen in Figure 2 in the case of Bahrain, the number of permit terminations did not increase after Q1 2020, but the inflows of workers (new visas) and stays (renewals of permits) went markedly down. In Saudi Arabia, similarly, the number of workers leaving their job in the private sector during the three quarters of 2020 (1,102,484), is close to the figure of job terminations during the Q2 to Q4 of 2019 (1,272,304).[40] At the same time, while 470,617 new entrants to the private sector were recorded during the Q2 to Q3 of 2019, the figure fell to 345,000 new entrants during Q1 to Q3 of 2020.[41] Figures thus suggest that the crisis, and subsequent border closures, limited the number of new entrants, rather than precipitating significant departures from Gulf states' labour markets, as was anticipated by observers. As a matter of fact, the number of new labour visas issued to enter Saudi Arabia during 2020 fell to 1,036,722, down from 2,063,605 in 2019. Some flexibility may also have been introduced to the region's labour markets. Employees made redundant in their company could be seconded to other employers during the crisis, for example via the "Virtual Labor Market" digital platform of the UAE's Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization (MoHRE), which provides employment services to job seekers and companies.[42] A similar labour re-employment platform was launched by Qatar's Chamber of Commerce and Industry in August 2020,[43] while Bahrain's LMRA launched a "talent portal" to connect migrant job seekers in Bahrain to employers in the private sector. Businesses in the private sector were also told to announce their job vacancies in local newspapers for a period of two weeks to prioritise local hiring, before issuing work permits to workers abroad, as of August 2020.[44]

Even if the figures had started decreasing before the crisis in some cases, data indicate that the Covid-19 crisis and subsequent economic downturn did affect numbers and inflow dynamics of foreign work migrants in the region. We now present data which suggest that the pandemic, so far, has not changed the structure of the labour market. International migrant worker distribution by activity and occupation, for instance, remained similar before and after the crisis.

Data available for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman on the distribution of foreign workers by activity, for example, display significant declines in the number of workers employed in their main sectors of employment in the private sector. The construction sector, for instance, lost 127,000 workers during the year 2020[45] in Saudi Arabia (-6.5 percent), and 52,000 left the wholesale and trade sector (-3.5 percent).[46] In Kuwait, the construction sector's workforce decreased by 38,000 workers (23 percent) and the real estate activities sector lost 45,000 persons (17 percent) (Annexed Table 5). Oman lost 108,292 workers from the construction sector (22 percent of the sector's workforce), 30,441 employees from its trade and wholesale sector (13 percent) and close to 20,000 employees (16 percent of the workforce) in the accommodation sector. Data for mid-2021 confirmed this downward trend. The construction sector's foreign workforce contracted further and eventually declined by almost 30 percent since December 2019 (133,000 workers) (Annexed Table 6). Data on labour permit holders in Jordan document a similar drop in the number of workers employed in the construction sector, from 27,331 in 2019, to 23,486 in 2020, a 14 percent drop.[47] However, in Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia, and presumably in the other three GCC states, the distribution of foreign workers by activity has remained stable. In Oman, for instance, the construction sector still employs most foreign workers in the private and domestic sectors: 26.1 percent in June 2021, a share almost unchanged since December 2019 (29.6 percent).[48] In Saudi Arabia, the share of foreign workers employed in construction (private sector) is similar in Q4 2019 and Q4 2020, at 30 percent. Those employed in wholesale and retail trade also continued making up 23 percent of all foreign workers over that period.[49] The numbers of migrant workers in GCC labour markets decreased in all sectors of activity, but their distribution by activity did not change significantly.

Interestingly, the occupational structure of migrant workers did not witness any immediate change either, as seen from Omani data (Table 6 bis). The least skilled category of occupation, for instance, which concentrated the largest number of foreign workers (702,100 at the end of 2019 and 553,889 at the end of 2020), thus lost 148,000 workers, a 21 percent drop between the two dates. However, these continue making up the largest share of foreign workers in the private and domestic sectors (40 percent). The share of "managers" and "specialists", the two categories of occupations concentrating the most skilled workers, did not change either during the 18 months. The distribution of private and domestic sector workers by education level, moreover, only available for Oman, also remained identical throughout 2020.

The crisis was indeed an opportunity for Gulf countries to decrease the size of their foreign workforce, in line with policies of workforce localisation conducted in these countries (Qatar and the UAE being an exception, to a certain extent, as their national workforce is too small to fill all posts). However, the upgrading of the workforce's qualifications and skills, also on the agenda, could not happen in the conditions created by the Covid-19 crisis.

**Table 1. Average monthly wages of paid employees by sex and sector (in Saudi Riyals)[50]**

| | | Government | | | Private | | | Other* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Males | Females | Total | Males | Females | Total | Males | Females | Total |
| 2919 | Q1 | 10,358 | 7,922 | **9,798** | 4,051 | 5,214 | **4,077** | 2,163 | 1,733 | **1,982** |
| | Q2 | 11,798 | 8,305 | **10,681** | 3,910 | 5,573 | **3,941** | 2,632 | 1,685 | **2,095** |
| 2020 | Q1 | 10,399 | 8,202 | **9,766** | 4,286 | 5,733 | **4,320** | 2,307 | 1,661 | **2,104** |
| | Q2 | 10,471 | 9,771 | **10,330** | 4,548 | 5,825 | **4,579** | 1,962 | 1,501 | **1,821** |
| | Q3 | 10,577 | 9,441 | **10,363** | 4,619 | 6,535 | **4,655** | 1,877 | 1,488 | **1,760** |
| | Q4 | 11,309 | 8,792 | **10,810** | 4,634 | 5,853 | **4,658** | 1,789 | 1,428 | **1,679** |

**Source: GAStat, Labour Force Surveys Q3 2019 to Q4 2020**

*Other includes self-employed, family workers, non-profit organizations and domestic labor, regional and international organizations

Beyond general data on the population and labour market structure, only a few datasets are available to capture the material impact of the Covid-19 twin crises on employed migrant workers. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia published some quarterly figures on the evolution of workers' wages during the pandemic. In Kuwait, foreign workers' salaries in the public and private sector increased steadily during the period, for women as well as for men. In Saudi Arabia, no major decline in salaries was reported (Table 1), but women experienced a decrease of their average wages in all sectors between Q3 and Q4 of 2020, in the range of 170 to 180 USD on average. Those in the "others" category, however, who are presumably a majority of domestic workers, had already suffered a more pronounced decline of their income since before the crisis. Explanation for this could not be found. One hypothesis may be that with the diversification of nationalities available for work in the domestic sector, average wages paid by employers have been decreasing on average. The growing employment of African domestic workers, especially, was said to be motivated by their lower salary expectations.

### 3. Differential migration dynamics and impact of Covid-19 by migrants' region of origin or citizenship

#### a. International migrants

As stated earlier, figures disaggregated by region of origin or country of citizenship are rare in Gulf statistics. Only Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait routinely publish such figures, usually for the 10 most numerous nationalities. Some estimates for selected nationalities are also available for Jordan.

The GCC-Asia migration corridor is the largest South-South corridor. As seen in Annexed Table 7,[51] the bulk of immigrants in the six GCC countries were from Asia (72 percent), making up between 58 and 92 percent of all immigrants, respectively in Kuwait and in Oman. The estimated 8.6 million Indian migrants alone make up the largest share of migrants in every GCC state (28 percent of all foreign residents in 2019), while Bangladeshis (about 3.6 million) and Pakistanis (about 3 million) ranked second and third. Indian migrants surpassed the 2- and 3-million thresholds, respectively in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two largest receivers of foreign labourers in the region. Indian nationals also made-up 31 percent of all foreign residents and half (54 percent) of all citizens of Asian states in Kuwait. Egyptians form the largest Arab community in every Gulf state, estimated to be at least 2,6 million in the region (Annexed Table 8).[52]

Migrants from sub-Saharan African countries are much fewer than other categories of migrants in the Gulf. Based on receiving countries' statistics,[53] their numbers in the region were estimated to stand below 300,000 in 2018-2019 (Annexed Table 7).[54] In Kuwait, for instance, African migrants (permit holders) accounted for a mere 1.7 percent of all migrants at the end of 2020, largely outnumbered by Asians (63 percent) and Arabs (34.5 percent).[55] The Bahraini census of early 2020 (date of reference: March 17) evaluated their number to 21,502, or 2.7 percent of the foreign resident population.

#### b. International migrant workers

Concerning workers specifically, administrative data from the Gulf states and Jordan confirms sub-Saharan African migrants' low share in the migrant workers population, ranging from 1.1 percent of workers in Kuwait to 4 percent in Jordan. Their (officially recorded) numbers do not exceed 167,000 in the five countries covered in Annexed Table 9.[56] Migrant workers from the Asian subcontinent dominate Gulf economies, making up from 70 percent of workers in Kuwait to 90 percent in Bahrain (Annexed Table 9).[57] In Saudi Arabia, Asian migrant workers occupy 67 percent of the jobs in the public and private sectors. Single nationalities (Indians and Bangladeshis in Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman, Egyptians in

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan) make up large shares of foreign workers' populations. In Oman, for example, Indians, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis together constituted 85 per cent of the total foreign workforce in 2020 (Annexed Table 9). In Jordan, Egyptians make up half of all registered foreign workers (Annexed Table 9). In Bahrain, Indians alone compose 44 percent of all migrant workers, 49 percent of men and 23 percent of women (Annexed Tables 9 and 10). Other nationalities dominate numerically among women workers, such as the Filipinos, which make up 35 percent of all women migrant workers in Bahrain, and Ethiopians which make up 12 percent (Annexed Table 10).[58]

In general, work migration to the Gulf states and Jordan appears very selective by gender: in Oman, for example, no national category displays a balanced sex ratio (Table 2). Filipinos, Indonesians, and African nationalities are largely composed of women: 99 percent of Ugandans, 89 percent of Tanzanians, 98 percent of Ethiopians (2018 data).[59] In Bahrain, Ethiopian and Kenyan workers are also quasi-exclusively women (Annexed Table 10).

**Table 2: Oman: Foreign population by country of citizenship (selected nationalities) and sex (2018)**[60]

| | Numbers | | | % females in total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Males** | **Females** | **Total** | |
| **India** | 648,167 | 100,294 | 748,461 | *13.4* |
| **Bangladesh** | 651,744 | 38,663 | 690,407 | *5.6* |
| **Pakistan** | 235,765 | 21,340 | 257,105 | *8.3* |
| **Egypt** | 32,831 | 17,600 | 50,431 | *34.9* |
| **Philippines** | 14,034 | 35,209 | 49,243 | *71.5* |
| **Uganda** | 352 | 31,634 | 31,986 | *98.9* |
| **Sri Lanka** | 7,334 | 15,729 | 23,063 | *68.2* |
| **Nepal** | 11,075 | 6,673 | 17,748 | *37.6* |
| **Tanzania** | 1,856 | 14,715 | 16,571 | *88.8* |
| **Indonesia** | 737 | 9,222 | 9,959 | *92.6* |
| **Ethiopia** | 126 | 8,303 | 8,429 | *98.5* |
| **total non-Omanis** | **1,690,362** | **332,108** | **2,022,470** | 16.4 |

Source: Author's calculations, based on total figures and percentage distribution of foreign nationals by sex in NCSI. *Population Statistics*, Issue 8, 2018-2019.

The selectivity of migration to the Gulf states and Jordan by gender and nationality is not necessarily associated with specific employment characteristics: only half of migrant women from Asia were employed in domestic sector jobs in 2020 in Bahrain, for instance. However, 99.9 percent of African migrant women were employed in that sector (Annexed Table 10). Residency permits data for Kuwait[61] also confirmed that African migrants in 2020 were mostly women (73 percent) in the country, who were most often involved in the domestic services sector (67 percent of all permits; 82 percent of female permit holders). Among men, 56 percent were employed in the private sector and 27 percent in domestic services. Data from Kuwait's Labour Market Information System (Table 3) supplies additional information on the country's domestic workers: Asian nationals from India, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka made up 93 percent of the total, with the highest number from India (319,000). Ethiopian nationals are the most numerous from African countries, with 13,804 domestic workers in 2020. Workers from Ivory Coast, Benin, and Madagascar numbered respectively 1,752, 2,186, and 1,899 (2019 figure).

**Table 3. Kuwait: Distribution of household domestic workers by country of citizenship (top10) and sex (Q4 2020)**

| | Males | Females | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| **India** | 221,623 | 97,710 | **319,333** |
| **Philippines** | 809 | 141,735 | **142,544** |
| **Bangladesh** | 80,457 | 969 | **81,426** |
| **Sri Lanka** | 15,900 | 61,365 | **77,265** |
| **Ethiopia** | 981 | 13,804 | **14,785** |
| **Nepal** | 974 | 13,450 | **14,424** |
| **Ivory Coast** | 12 | 2,587 | **1,752** |
| **Indonesia** | 103 | 2,083 | **2,599** |
| **Benin** | 168 | 1,584 | **2,186** |
| **Madagascar** | 5 | 1,894 | **1,899** |
| **Pakistan** | 1,654 | 11 | **1,665** |
| **Other Nationalities** | 5,569 | 5,067 | **10,636** |
| **Total** | **328,250** | **340,365** | **668,615** |

Source: Integrated database, LMIS.

The selectivity of work migration and employment by region of origin or single nationality is also visible in migrants' employment characteristics. In Kuwait, Arab and European nationals, who are very rarely employed in domestic services, can occupy jobs in Kuwait's increasingly closed public sector (above 8 percent). A third of Arab migrant women (35 percent), especially, are employed in the public sector (Table 4).

**Table 4: Kuwait: distribution of migrants in each group of countries of origin, by sex and sector of employment (public, private) (Q4 2020)**

| | Government Sector | | | Private Sector | | | % in public sector | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Males | Females | Total | Males | Females | Total | Males | Females | Total |
| **Arab countries** | 31,884 | 20,778 | **52,662** | 534,627 | 38,564 | **573,191** | 5.6 | 35.0 | **8.4** |
| **Asia** | 18,731 | 17,174 | **35,905** | 808,908 | 86,984 | **895,892** | 2.3 | 16.5 | **3.9** |
| **Africa** | 163 | 82 | **245** | 7,313 | 2,554 | **9,867** | 2.2 | 3.1 | **2.4** |
| **Europe** | 310 | 273 | **583** | 4,277 | 1,998 | **6,275** | 6.8 | 12.0 | **8.5** |
| **Americas and Oceania** | 379 | 159 | **538** | 6,605 | 2,293 | **8,898** | 5.4 | 6.5 | **5.7** |
| **Not Stated** | 1,094 | 1,334 | **2,428** | 10 | | **10** | | | |
| **Total** | **52,561** | **39,800** | **92,361** | **1,361,740** | **132,393** | **1,494,133** | **3.7** | **23.1** | **5.8** |

Source: Integrated Database, LMIS.

In Jordan, Arab workers and among them, Egyptian and Syrian nationals, made the bulk of the migrant workers, respectively 63, 49 and 11 percent of the foreign legal workforce (permit holders) in 2019. Arab workers are predominantly men (99 percent of Egyptians, 93 percent of Syrians), while some Asian nationals mostly employed in domestic services (Filipinas, Bangladeshis) are predominantly women. Agriculture is the major employer of Egyptians (31 percent) and Syrians (47 percent). Egyptians also work in "personal and social services" (24 percent), in the domestic work sector (as gardeners and house guards, for instance), while the "trade, hotels and restaurants", and manufacturing sectors employ respectively 14 and 10 percent of Syrians. Sri Lankans, men, and women, as well as Bangladeshi women are split between the manufacturing and domestic services sectors. Nationals from African countries are in numbers too small to appear in statistics, but some Ethiopians and other nationalities started coming to the country during the 2010s.[62]

Despite the existence of such figures, the prevalence of irregularity in major migrant-receiving countries like Saudi Arabia, makes it difficult to come up with accurate evaluations of African migrants' numbers and detailed characteristics. Some migrants may enter legally, for example those entering with a visit or Umrah visa, or those immigrating to the region within the framework of the several bilateral labour agreements signed between Kenya and Middle Eastern countries; yet, they fall into an irregular status if they overstay their legal stay period, if they take up employment while holding a visit visa, if the sponsor fails to renew their documents when expired, or if they abscond to escape abuses. Other migrants, for instance migrants from the Horn of Africa region, often cross through Yemen to reach Saudi Arabia, and enter irregularly.[63] Some of them may remain in the region unaccounted for. The prevalence of irregularity among African migrants, and especially Ethiopians and Kenyans, may also result from the ban periods imposed by the two countries' governments to address abuses against their nationals in the Middle East. Ethiopia banned migration to Middle East countries from October 2013 to February 2018, while Kenya banned private recruitment agencies from sending domestic workers to the Middle East between 2014 and 2017. Yet, migration to the region continued through irregular networks, which increased migrants' vulnerability and lack of protection. Police operations against illegal immigrants conducted in Saudi Arabia in 2013 and 2017, and in Oman and in Kuwait since 2011,[64] especially targeted African migrants, and Ethiopians among them.[65] In Kuwait, for instance, African migrants numbered 36,718 in 2020, down from 53,778 in 2017, and a marked drop from ten years ago: In 2012 African countries' nationals were almost 100,000 (92,324) in Kuwait. Ethiopians alone numbered 77,000 in 2012 and made up 84 per cent of all African countries' nationals,[66] as compared to 14,785 late 2020.

African migrants' numbers are, however, bound to be increasing, especially in the domestic labour sector. One of the reasons is receiving states' needs for less expensive labourers, able to replace some of the established foreign workers from Arab and Asian countries.[67]

### c. Impact of the Covid-19 crisis on selected nationalities

As many as 192,294 Asian migrants lost their residence status in 2020 in Kuwait, as well as 50,506 Arabs. These numbers made up respectively 10 and 5 percent of the two large communities. However, the decline in foreign workers' numbers due to the Covid crisis and subsequent economic downturn affected African workers disproportionately. Almost 9,000 African nationals lost their residency during 2020, which makes up almost 20 percent of this nationality group (Table 5). The crisis, therefore, accentuated the decline in the number of African migrants in Kuwait, who numbered almost 100,000 in 2012 as we have seen. It is also possible that an increasing share of these nationals fell into an irregular status after losing their employment.

**Table 5: Kuwait: evolution of the numbers of permit holders (all categories of residency permits) by group of countries of origin (2017-2020)**

| | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arab countries | 916,169 | 952,261 | 997,788 | 947,282 |
| Non-Arab Asian countries | 1,775,919 | 1,849,050 | 1,921,465 | 1,729,171 |
| Non-Arab African countries | 47,254 | 53,778 | 45,697 | 36,718 |
| European countries | 13,565 | 13,726 | 13,435 | 12,101 |
| North American Countries | 19,079 | 19,223 | 18,899 | 17,882 |
| South and Central American Cour | 1,499 | 1,746 | 1,897 | 1,934 |
| Australia and Pacific Group | 1,467 | 1,469 | 1,430 | 1,350 |
| A group of other nationalities | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| **Total** | **2,774,955** | **2,891,255** | **3,000,613** | **2,746,439** |
| Source: CSB, Migration Statistics 2020 | | | | |

In Oman, Indian nationals were most impacted from the crisis and their stocks decreased by 20 percent (125,000 persons) during 2020. All nationalities declined by 10 to 12 percent during the crisis. Tanzanians who numbered 14,742 in 2019, fell to 13,555 individuals in December 2020. Nonetheless, Ugandan nationals suffered most, with a 47 percent drop in their numbers during 2020 (Table 6).

However, like in Kuwait, the effect of the crisis should be reinscribed in longer-term dynamics. Some nationalities such as Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis started leaving Oman, or fell into an irregular status, since before 2020. As for Ethiopians, their numbers show a decrease since the mid-2010s. These nationals became outnumbered by other nationalities, also from Africa, whose numbers also quickly deflated, for example the Ugandans after 2018. Table 6 suggests that African nationals have difficulties anchoring themselves in the Middle East, and that numbers of immigrants from Africa fade rapidly after their first arrival in the region. It is possible, like in the case of the Ethiopians, that irregularity becomes the norm among these populations, who are often employed in domestic services, hence, more easily staying (or kept) in informal employment.

**Table 6. Oman: Evolution of the numbers of employed migrant workers (2013-2020) (selected nationalities)**

| | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | % change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | 2019-2020 | 2015-2020 |
| **Egypt** | 24,532 | 25,985 | 28,510 | 31,725 | 35,048 | 30,961 | *-11.7* | *26.2* |
| **Bangladesh** | 590,170 | 698,881 | 692,164 | 658,222 | 630,681 | 553,963 | *-12.2* | *-6.1* |
| **India** | 669,882 | 689,600 | 688,226 | 660,736 | 617,730 | 492,303 | *-20.3* | *-26.5* |
| **Pakistan** | 220,112 | 232,426 | 234,163 | 217,602 | 207,288 | 180,629 | *-12.9* | *-17.9* |
| **Philippines** | 34,511 | 40,976 | 45,063 | 47,896 | 49,456 | 44,097 | *-10.8* | *27.8* |
| **Sri Lanka** | 15,752 | 19,210 | 20,640 | 20,925 | 23,099 | 20,717 | *-10.3* | *31.5* |
| **Nepal** | 13,292 | 15,308 | 17,194 | 17,057 | 16,571 | 14,025 | *-15.4* | *5.5* |
| **Indonesia** | 32,535 | 19,216 | | | | | | |
| **Ethiopia** | 24,009 | 16,673 | | | | | | |
| **Tanzania** | | | 11,709 | 13,818 | 14,742 | 13,555 | *-8.1* | |
| **Uganda** | | | 24,449 | 31,288 | 20,997 | 11,098 | *-47.1* | |
| **Other Nationalities** | 72,876 | 89,900 | 92,762 | 88,178 | 97,186 | 81,780 | *-15.9* | *12.2* |
| **Total** | **1,697,671** | **1,848,175** | **1,854,880** | **1,787,447** | **1,712,798** | **1,443,128** | -15.7 | -15.0 |

Source: NCSI, *Monthly Statistical Bulletins* (December of each year).

Migrant workers in Bahrain (public and private sectors) suffered an equally impressive drop of their numbers due to the Covid-19 crisis, between 2019 and 2020 (Table 7). In the case of Bahrain, however, migrants from African countries (here: Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Cameroon) were comparatively less affected by the crisis than some Asian nationals (from India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka). Moreover, unlike in Kuwait, the numbers of African nationals had been on the increase before the crisis, which cut short their expansion in Bahrain.

**Table 7. Bahrain: Evolution of the numbers of migrant workers in the public and private sectors (selected nationalities, Q4 2015-Q4 2020)**

| | Q4 2015 | Q4 2016 | Q4 2017 | Q4 2018 | Q4 2019 | Q4 2020 | % change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | 2019-2020 | 2015-2020 |
| **Egypt** | 8,951 | 9,141 | 10,193 | 11,380 | 11,348 | 10,262 | *-9.6* | *14.6* |
| **Jordan** | 3,160 | 3,093 | 3,163 | 3,246 | 3,230 | 2,847 | *-11.9* | *-9.9* |
| **Yemen** | 2,417 | 2,486 | 2,517 | 2,719 | 2,719 | 2,517 | *-7.4* | *4.1* |
| **India** | 212,750 | 221,449 | 235,858 | 241,473 | 236,546 | 206,720 | *-12.6* | *-2.8* |
| **Bangladesh** | 114,886 | 164,377 | 129,729 | 126,967 | 124,257 | 125,855 | *1.3* | *9.5* |
| **Pakistan** | 42,615 | 44,771 | 45,933 | 43,240 | 45,473 | 45,910 | *1.0* | *7.7* |
| **Philippines** | 28,613 | 30,539 | 31,328 | 32,419 | 31,636 | 27,562 | *-12.9* | *-3.7* |
| **Nepal** | 13,882 | 14,178 | 15,711 | 17,168 | 17,559 | 15,852 | *-9.7* | *14.2* |
| **Sri Lanka** | 6,051 | 4,271 | 4,103 | 4,046 | 4,017 | 3,513 | *-12.5* | *-41.9* |
| **Kenya** | 906 | 1,223 | 1,536 | 1,974 | 2,168 | 2,107 | *-2.8* | *132.6* |
| **Ethiopia** | 874 | 960 | 1,121 | 1,109 | 1,137 | 1,027 | *-9.7* | *17.5* |
| **Uganda** | | | | | 1,390 | 1,435 | *3.2* | |
| **Cameroon** | | | | | 990 | 1,020 | *3.0* | |
| **Total** | **455,223** | **518,582** | **504,721** | **511,556** | **507,171** | **468,325** | -7.7 | 2.9 |

Source: LMRA, Expatriates Management System, in: Bahrain Labour Market Indicators.
EMS data refer to Expat visa applications (GCC workers not included).

The situation looks different for domestic workers. All nationalities were affected by the crisis, but Ethiopians more than others (-31 percent during 2020, between Q4 2019 and Q4 2020). Yet, like in the case of Kuwait and Oman for all categories of workers, the Covid-19 crisis accentuated a longer-term dynamic, which pre-existed the crisis. Numbers of domestic workers were effectively decreasing since 2018. Ethiopians, especially, ranked first in 2018, but their numbers were halved in two years (Table 8).[68]

**Table 8. Bahrain: Evolution of the numbers of domestic workers (selected nationalities, Q4 2018-Q4 2020)**

| | Q4 2018 | Q4 2019 | Q4 2020 | % change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | 2018-2020 | 2019-2020 |
| **India** | 20,633 | 20,143 | 16,997 | *-17.6* | *-15.6* |
| **Philippines** | 19,911 | 18,704 | 16,582 | *-16.7* | *-11.3* |
| **Bangladesh** | 9,605 | 9,426 | 8,304 | *-13.5* | *-11.9* |
| **Indonesia** | 6,662 | 5,941 | 4,636 | *-30.4* | *-22.0* |
| **Sri Lanka** | 3,424 | 3,325 | 2,973 | *-13.2* | *-10.6* |
| **Pakistan** | 2,589 | 2,868 | 2,722 | *5.1* | *-5.1* |
| **Ethiopia** | 21,647 | 15,694 | 10,837 | *-49.9* | *-30.9* |
| **Kenya** | 3,694 | 5,258 | 4,353 | *17.8* | *-17.2* |
| **Total** | **90,591** | **84,010** | **69,874** | -22.9 | -16.8 |

Source: LMRA, Domestic Workers System, in: Bahrain Labour Market Indicators.

Updated numerical data are unavailable for Jordan, which would allow measuring the impact of the crisis on foreign workers. Figures of departures, loss of employment, decrease in salaries, for instance, are non-existent in Jordanian and international sources, while documentation about migrants' situation remains scarce.[69] The June 2021 UNHCR report on Syrian refugees' economic integration[70] indicated that 239,024 work permits (cumulated) had been issued to Syrian refugees, of whom 315,000 were of working age (47 percent of the 668,000 registered Syrian refugees). However, the last census conducted in Jordan in 2015 had enumerated 1.3 million Syrian nationals in the country. It is unlikely that large numbers went back to Syria.

Despite the international agreement passed during the London Conference of 2016 that bound Jordan to grant 200,000 work permits to Syrian refugees in return for a compact of assistance, many refugees, among whom some UNHCR-registered refugees, must work informally. Field surveys report that lockdown measures incurred reduction and losses in wage income for the surveyed workers.[71] In Jordan, the fragility of the economy[72] due to the prevalence of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) for instance in construction, and the sector's reliance on informal migrant workers, most likely had a devastating effect on migrants' employment. For example, the many Egyptian workers in Jordan may be durably hit by job losses. Apart from agriculture and domestic services (in gardening, guarding and security), Egyptian workers in Jordan are employed in economic sectors such as construction and hospitality, two sectors which were affected by the economic downturn. Moreover, they often work as daily workers for many employers. Egyptian and other low-skilled workers were thus particularly concerned by curfews and limitations of mobility, by the freezing of economic activities, and because of their lack of social protection due to their informal employment situation and their concentration in activity sectors not covered by the Labour Law, which opens no rights to social security guarantees. For these reasons, it is also difficult to provide figures assessing the economic crisis's impact on the employment of Egyptians.

A rapid assessment of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on vulnerable groups in the Jordanian labor market, including Jordanians, Syrian refugees, women, and workers in informal employment effectively highlighted the devastating effects of the lockdown measures and ensuing economic downturn on these workers. Surveyed Syrian refugees were among those most hard hit as a result of their largely informal employment situation, whether in relation to lack of written contracts, social security and health insurance coverage or valid work permits.[73] A FAFO/ILO survey conducted on Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon concluded that one-third of the interviewed Syrian workers in Jordan had lost their jobs permanently due to the crisis. The survey also pinpointed employers' differential treatment towards nationals, as compared to non-nationals: Jordanian citizens reported much lower incidences of job losses than Syrian refugees in Jordan.[74]

## 4. Figures of returns due to Covid-19 crisis

### Kenya

As explained in part one of this report, estimating the return of citizens from emigration countries is a difficult task. Kenya is no exception. Pending the publication of 2019 census results on Kenyan migrants abroad, which are underestimated as explained in section 1, the size of the Kenyan diaspora[75] was estimated to be around 4 million, of whom 2 million workers were registered with Kenyan embassies abroad.[76] Estimates of Kenyan migrants in Gulf countries range between 100,000 in the mid-2010s (official government estimates)[77] and 300,000.[78] In 2012, before a ban on recruitment of Kenyan domestic workers in the Middle East was enacted by Kenyan authorities in 2014, a Saudi official claimed that 40,000 Kenyan migrants were working in Saudi Arabia.[79] In August 2021, a Kenya Labour Ministry official quoted the figure of 97,000 Kenyan workers employed in Saudi Arabia.[80] Available estimates of Kenyan migrants in Gulf states are as follows:

**Table 9. Estimates of the numbers of Kenyan migrants in Gulf countries (last available date)**

| | Numbers | Date of estimate and coverage |
|---|---|---|
| **Bahrain** | 4,359 | 2020 (workers, all sectors) |
| **Kuwait** | n.a. | |
| **Oman** | n.a. | |
| **Qatar** | 30,000 | 2019 (total population) |
| **Saudi Arabia** | 97,000 | 2020 (workers, all sectors?) |
| **UAE** | 40,000 | c. 2014 (total population) |

Source: Bahrain : see Annexed Table 9 and 10; Qatar: Data from foreign embassies and press sources (national or foreign officials), in: Population of Qatar by nationality - 2019 report, Priya DSouza Consultancy, 2019 http://priyadsouza.com/population-of-qatar-by-nationality-in-2017/; Saudi Arabia: Otieno, B. "CS to visit Saudi Arabia over detention centres 'full of Kenyans'", *the Star*, 19 August 2021; https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/coast/2021-08-19-cs-to-visit-saudi-arabia-over-detention-centres-full-of-kenyans/; UAE: Data from foreign embassies and press sources (national or foreign officials), in: Snoj, Jure. "UAE's population- by nationality", *BQ Magazine*, Doha, April 12, 2015 (no link).[81]

Between January 2019 and August 2021, the Ministry of Labour facilitated the employment of over 87,784 Kenyans in the Gulf region. Most of these migrant workers were employed in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and Bahrain.[82] Between March 2019 and January 2021, 29,448 Kenyan migrant workers were cleared to work in Saudi Arabian homes, as domestic workers.[83] 30,000 more workers were to be sent to the Gulf region in mid-2021.[84]

Since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and economic crisis, the Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs documented the repatriation of 569 Kenyans from Saudi Arabia between March and September 2020, of whom 404 were documented and 165 were undocumented.[85] Significant, but unknown numbers of Kenyans are also kept in detention centres, awaiting deportation from Gulf states back to Kenya, which prompted initiatives to better monitor the numbers and situation of Kenyan migrants in Gulf states, especially in Saudi Arabia.[86]

### Ethiopia

Around 2017, it was estimated that around 400,000 Ethiopians in irregular situations were in Saudi Arabia.[87] Based on interviews conducted in Ethiopia, the country's Labour Force Migration Survey conducted in January and February 2021,[88] the first ever to tackle international migration, estimated that 839,224 Ethiopians were living abroad in January-February 2021, of whom 31 percent were in Saudi Arabia (c. 280,000) and 9 percent in the UAE (c. 75,000). Gathering data on emigrants from family members in the country does not allow capturing fully accurate figures of the number of expatriates: interviewed family members may not be aware of migrants' details, and migrants' households leaving no member in the home country are, consequently, missed in survey samples. However, the survey highlighted that most migrants emigrated alone, at a young age (15-29), which limits such caveats in the case of Ethiopia's LFMS. Based on these and on figures provided by GCC administrative sources (Annexed Table 9), estimates of Ethiopians in Gulf states may be as follows:

**Table 10. Estimates of the numbers of Ethiopian migrants in Gulf countries (last available date)**

| | Numbers | Date of estimate and coverage |
|---|---|---|
| Bahrain | 14,837 | Q4 2020 (workers, all sectors) |
| Kuwait | 14,785 | Q4 2020 (domestic workers) |
| Oman | 13,572 | Mid-2017 (workers, all sectors) |
| Qatar | 25,000 | 01/2018 (total population) |
| Saudi Arabia | 280,000 | 01-02/2021 (total population) |
| UAE | 75,000 | 01-02/2021 (total population) |

Source: Bahrain; Kuwait: see Annexed Table 9; Oman: Monthly statistical Bulletin, July 2017; Qatar: Data from foreign embassies and press sources (national or foreign officials), in: Population of Qatar by nationality - 2019 report, Priya DSouza Consultancy, 2019 http://priyadsouza.com/population-of-qatar-by-nationality-in-2017/;[89] Saudi Arabia and UAE: LFMS 2021.

As of September 2021, no estimate of the number of returnees from Middle East countries due to Covid-19 is available from the results of LFMS 2021 released so far (the survey's key findings). In 2017, Saudi Arabia launched a large-scale campaign against foreign residents in an irregular administrative situation, called "A Nation Without Violators". Hundreds of Ethiopians were rounded up during the campaign and detained before being sent back to Ethiopia.[90] As of June 2021, IOM teams had registered a total of 383,382 returnees from Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia since April 2017,[91] although the organization estimates that returns to Ethiopia following the decree were likely to be even higher. IOM data, therefore, do not allow pinpointing the effect of the Covid-19 crisis alone on Ethiopian migrants' returns.

Between the start of Covid-19 pandemic and mid-April 2020, Saudi Arabia deported 2,870 Ethiopian migrants to Addis Ababa, and purportedly had the intention to send back a total of 200,000 Ethiopian migrants in irregular situation, before international outcry halted deportations.[92] On June 9, IOM had registered 3,000 Ethiopian returnees from Saudi Arabia since April.[93] However, a Human Rights Watch report estimated that thousands of Ethiopian migrants forcibly expelled from Yemen by the Houthi armed groups in April were detained in Saudi Arabia.[94] The pandemic made the conditions of detained migrants more insufferable in Saudi Arabia's detention centres, which alerted international media attention. Migrants' returns since January 2021 were thus planned for at a rate of 1,000 repatriations a week, to bring home the estimated 16,000 Ethiopians detained in Saudi Arabia as of December 2020.[95] As of July 2021, the Ethiopian government announced that it had ultimately  repatriated 41,000 citizens detained for irregular residency in Saudi Arabia[96] No data is available on recent returns from other Gulf countries, where Ethiopians are also in sizeable numbers, yet often working without documents.

## Conclusion

The analysis of data on the evolution of stocks of international migrants and international migrant workers in the six GCC states and Jordan was used to investigate the impact of the Covid-19-related health and economic crises on these populations. Available statistics highlighted a significant drop in the numbers of international migrants in the region between the end of 2019 and the end of 2020, except in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and in the Emirate of Dubai. Oman, especially, witnessed a 16 percent decrease in its international migrants' population over the year 2020, while other countries lost 3 to 4 percent of their migrants' population. Numbers of international migrant workers in their three sectors of employment (public, private, and domestic), declined as a consequence of the Covid-19 crisis, by 6 percent in Qatar between Q1 2020 and Q1 2021, for instance. The figures of international migrant workers, who are mostly employed in the private and domestic sectors in the region, dropped in the seven countries during 2020, from 4 percent in Saudi Arabia to 16 percent in Oman (private sector), and by as much as a third in Jordan (figures of permit holders).

However, the effect of the Covid-19 crisis must be reinscribed in the larger context of the 2010s in the region, which witnessed large campaigns of deportations of migrants in irregular administrative situation in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait especially, as well as policies of workforce's nationalisation (Saudisation, Omanisation…). Figures of migrant workers in the private sector in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain, for instance, had started decreasing notably before 2020.

Numbers of workers declined in every activity sector, such as construction, wholesale and trade, and hospitality. However, the Covid-19 crisis does not seem to have changed the occupational and activity distribution of migrant workers. Those sectors (with manufacturing in Jordan) are still the major employers of foreign migrants everywhere. Data available for Oman only indicated that the occupational structure of migrant workers had not witnessed any immediate change either. The least skilled categories of occupation concentrated lower numbers of foreign workers than before the crisis in December 2019, but these continued making up the largest share of foreign workers in the private and domestic sectors (40 percent). At the same time, women migrant workers and those in the domestic sector suffered a drop in their average wages, which accelerated throughout the year 2020. Our hypothesis is that Gulf states may have used the crisis as an "opportunity" to decrease the size of foreign migrants' communities, in line with pre-crisis policies, either motivated by security concerns (deportations of irregular workers), or by labour nationalisation measures that banned, or significantly limited, foreign workers from many professions and sectors.

Using rare administrative data disaggregated by country of citizenship for Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait (taken from administrative records of residency and work permits), the report highlighted the numeric domination of women among African migrants, and their concentration in the domestic sector. Data also indicated that workers of all nationalities and groups of nationalities (Asians, Africans) suffered a decline in numbers due to the Covid-19 crisis and subsequent economic downturn. However, African workers were comparatively more affected: while 5 percent of Arab workers and 10 percent of Asian workers had lost their residencies in Kuwait by the end of 2020 (either left the country, or fell into an irregular status), 20 percent of African workers were in that situation, for example. The figures also underlined the general downward trend of their numbers in the three countries over the 2010s. This was indicative of the vulnerability of African migrants during operations against illegal immigrants conducted in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait since 2010. We hypothesized that the prevalence of irregularity among African migrants, hence, lack of protection against abuses and deportations from the host state, may have been aggravated by the bans on migration to the Middle East, put in place for example by Kenya and Ethiopia during the 2010s. These bans did not stop outflows of African workers but forced them to use corrupt placement agencies in the origin and destination countries, hence migrants' increased vulnerability to abuses.

Data also highlighted the fluctuations of African migrants' distribution by origin country, since the early 2010s. We hypothesize that destination countries seek to diversify the origin of their migrant workforce in order to limit human rights and other claims from large national groups, as well as recruit nationalities with lower expectations in terms of salary and work conditions.

The report finally sought to summarise data available on returns of workers to Ethiopia and Kenya due to the pandemic. Some sporadic estimates were released in the press, which underlines the poor monitoring of migrant workers from these two countries by their governments.

In this report, we have extensively used administrative data, which allow a regular supply of information to monitor migrant workers' movements and, to a lesser extent, socioeconomic situation. These data are not necessarily publicly accessible in Gulf states and Jordan. Moreover, they leave aside a large component of migrant workers in the region, those in irregular situation. Fluctuations in the definition of irregularity, added to the multifaceted, transient, context- and time-specific nature of the phenomenon,[97] further complicate the evaluation of migrants' stocks and flows. However, administrative statistical systems are increasingly fine-tuned by authorities in Gulf migrants' host states. A regular exchange of data on migrants' numbers and characteristics through governmental agreements between origin and destination countries would thus help the former to better monitor migrants, as well as prepare to face returns at times of crises. Organising large-scale surveys on expatriates would help in complementing administrative data, like was done in Kerala, India, for example. The 2020 Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) was used by the Government of Kerala to manage the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as to prepare for the eventual return migrants for their integration and rehabilitation in the region.[98]

## Endnotes

1 The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

2 International Migrant Stock 2019 Database (https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp)

3 Sources: see Annexed Table 1.

4 Source : receiving countries' statistics (population censuses, population registers, residency and labour permits records), in: Gulf Labour Market and Migration database and publications on Gulf countries (http://gulfmigration.grc.net/), International Migrant Stock 2019 Database (https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp), World Population Prospects 2019 Database, Rev. 1 (https://population.un.org/wpp/) and De Bel-Air, F. "Migration Profile: Jordan", MPC Policy Brief n°2016/06, November 2016 (http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/44065) (updated 2020). In Jordan, a large share of the refugees (especially the refugees from the State of Palestine and their descendants) are not migrants. They were born in Jordan and hold Jordanian nationality. Therefore, the two categories of "refugees" and "migrants" only partly overlap in this country.

5 Saudi Ministry of Health data: https://www.moh.gov.sa/en/Ministry/MediaCenter/News/Pages/News-2020-04-20-002.aspx.

6 Khamis, Faryal, and others (2020). Epidemiology of COVID-19 Infection in Oman: Analysis of the First 1304 Cases. Oman Medical Journal, vol. 35, No. 3 (June).

7 https://app.klipfolio.com/published/1eed6ab18768edfc95042a772fc87532/kuwait-corona-statistics-index-english-version.

8 In this report, we use the ILO concepts of 1. "international migrants" and 2. "international migrant workers" to designate, respectively: 1. The total international immigrant populations in host states, i.e., workers, their family dependents, all other non-employed foreign residents; and 2. the workers alone.

9 https://www.mfa.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Kenya-Diaspora-Policy.pdf.

10 https://migrationpolicy.unescwa.org/node/3628; https://allafrica.com/stories/202105070040.html

11 https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/kenya-to-finalise-pacts-with-three-middle-east-states-3481514.

12 The data recorded on each cardholder (biometric, socio-demographic, events pertaining to the migration and economic status and more), constitute a de facto population registry. Moreover, this register is updated in real time: arrivals, departures, returns, visa applications, permits granted, renewed, cancelled by category of stay, changes of permit category, of sponsorship, change of address, births, and deaths, etc. Information pertaining to the residents is increasingly centralised in one single institution in each country.

13 PACI's database is connected electronically with other administrations and bodies registering demographic events and professional/ residency issues (births and death; departures and arrivals; end of service, residency, and ID deliveries, etc.). PACI's records of residents' movements is thus regularly updated, which limits the risk of population overcount. Therefore, it is more likely that residents were undercounted during CSO- Ministry of Planning's census operations (Shah, N. Population of Kuwait. Structure and Dynamics, Kuwait: Kuwait University Academic Publication Council, 2010, chapter 1).

14 Except in Bahrain (naturalisations of Sunni Muslims to counterbalance the Shi'ite demographic majority in the country during the 2000s) and in Jordan, concerning Palestinian refugees of 1948 and 1967, who are out of the scope of this report (see the Jordan section). In 2020, the UAE opened a path for naturalisation, but it is extremely selective and only concerns very wealthy expatriates or foreigners of exceptional talents.

15 The Arabic term used to designate foreign residents in these countries is wafed, pl. wafidîn, which designates foreigners who arrived, and is generally used for students and workers.

16 See for example the "definitions" section of Qatar's Labour Force Survey 2020: https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics/

Statistical%20Releases/Social/LaborForce/2020/Annual_Bulletin_Labour_force_2020_AE.pdf.
17 See "citizenship" and "foreign worker" articles (http://blmi.lmra.bh/mi_glossary.xml#Foreign%20worker).
18 To the exception of Jordan, in the framework of MoUs with UNHCR.
19 Gulf countries, however, accommodate certain displaced populations as de facto refugees. In Saudi Arabia, for example, some Palestinians, Rohingyas, Uighurs were naturalised since the 1950s. Those not naturalised are protected from deportation. These nationals can also enrol their children in public education (Shaker, A. "Belonging in transience: multi-generational migrants in Saudi Arabia", Migrant Rights, 7 October 2019 (https://www.migrant-rights.org/2019/10/belonging-in-transience-multi-generational-migrants-in-saudi-arabia/). Syrian and Yemeni refugees, under specific conditions, were also given the possibility to access employment (Osmandzikovic, E. "The Saudi Approach to Reception and Accommodation: The Case of Displaced Syrians", Commentaries, King Faysal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 22 April 2019).
20 The ICLS Guidelines Concerning Statistics of International Labour Migration 2013 and 2018. ILO (2018) 20th ICLS Guidelines concerning statistics of international labour migration, 10-19 October 2018.
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_648922.pdf
21 https://gulfmigration.grc.net/kuwait-non-kuwaiti-population-place-birth-kuwait-outside-kuwait-age-group-december-2017/.
22 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-22/oxford-economics-sees-exodus-of-expat-workers-from-across-gcc.
23 https://www.arabianbusiness.com/458729-gulf-population-falls-4-amid-pandemic-fuelled-expat-exodus-says-sp
24 Author's calculation, based on monthly population estimates available from the data portal of the National Centre for Statistics and Information (accessed December 2020).
25 Dubai Statistics Center (DSC), Population and Vital Statistics reports, 2020 data (https://www.dsc.gov.ae/en-us/Themes/Pages/Population-and-Vital-Statistics.aspx?Theme=42; https://www.dsc.gov.ae/Report/DSC_SYB_2020_01_03.pdf).
26 https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/covid-19-gulf-expats-forced-to-leave-for-home-as-pandemic-impacts-jobs-1.72112920
27 Qatar and the UAE only publish population figures not disaggregated by nationality. However, demographic growth rates are mostly influenced by foreign migrants' movements, due to the latter's very large share in the two countries' populations (around 85-88 percent, see Annexed Table 1).
28 Growth rates became negative.
29 https://www.internationalinvestment.net/news/4016744/million-expats-forecast-leave-saudi-arabia.
30 Figures of residency permits issued, GAStat. Annual Statistical Abstracts 2017 to 2019, "Population" section (last available data as of 13 September 2021).
31 Jordan's population increased significantly since 2011, due to the inflows of Syrian refugees. No disaggregated population figures of population are available after 2019, as of September 2021.
32 See GLMM publications and "Demography, Migration and the Labour Market" reports for the six countries (https://gulfmigration.grc.net/publications/).
33 Age and sex structures of foreign populations after mid-2020 were unavailable at the time of writing (August 2021).
34 No data on employment were available for 2020 in Jordan, and for Q4 of 2020 in Qatar at the time of writing (end of August 2021). Data for the UAE and Dubai Emirate are presented as percentages and cannot be processed.
35 All sectors, including the domestic sector. For numbers, see Annexed Tables 3 and 4.
36 Planning and Statistics Authority (PSA), Labour Force Surveys (Quarterly Reports). Reports for Q3 and Q4 2020 were not published.
37 Between Q4 2019 and Q4 2020.
38 Sources: same as sources of Figures 3 and 4.
39 Jordan Ministry of Labour, Figures of permit holders by activity sector (unpublished figures as of 13 September 2021).
40 No more data available on job terminations.

41 GAStat, Labour Force Surveys Q2 2019 to Q3 2020.

42 https://careers.mohre.gov.ae/.

43 https://jobs.qatarchamber.com/.

44 https://www.migrant-rights.org/2020/08/bahrain-to-resume-issuing-work-permits-for-workers-who-are-abroad/.

45 Between Q4 2019 and Q4 2020.

46 GAStat, Labour Force Surveys Q4 2019 and Q4 2020. The data is taken from GOSI records, and includes a share of the employees of the public sector.

47 Jordan Ministry of Labour, Figures of permit holders by activity sector (unpublished for 2020 as of 13 September 2021).

48 Author's calculation from figures in Annexed Table 6.

49 Author's calculation from figures in Annexed Table 5.

50 10 Saudi Riyals=2.67 US$ (July 2021). Data on wages are taken from the Labour Force Survey's direct interviews with workers and employers. It is likely that employers could inflate the wages they declare for their employees, and domestic employees.

51 Data in Annexed Table 7 is based on receiving countries' statistics, as published by Gulf states and Jordan's data-producing bodies and retabulated in Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Programme's website (https://gulfmigration.grc.net/). UNDESA estimates (International Migrant Stock 2019 Database) were only used in case no data was available from receiving countries' own statistics. On Jordan (see note (a) in the table), our estimate of the migrant population significantly differs from that of UNDESA's. Our estimate includes some 650,000 foreign residents originating from Palestine (figure updated from the Jordanian census of 2015). This figure was considered more reliable than UNDESA's, which includes 2.2 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA in Jordan in 2019, because most of the registered refugees from Palestine are descendants of forced migrants. They are neither migrant (they are born in Jordan), nor foreign nationals (they are Jordanian nationals).

52 The estimated figure of 300,000 Egyptians in Qatar should be taken with caution. The authors of the study note that: "A notable change has been detected in the Egyptian population, with the number increasing from 200,000 to 300,000 in the span of only three years (2015 to 2018). Considering the relationship between the two countries has been hostile in recent years, there is always a possibility that the numbers given by the Minister of State for Emigration and Egyptian Expatriates, are politically motivated". Besides, the estimates in this source are mostly retrieved from embassies and origin countries in Qatar (the figures of the Egyptian Ministry of Emigration and Egyptian Expatriates in this case). Origin countries' estimates of their nationals abroad, as well embassies' sources may be unreliable, because 1. Many migrants are not registered in their respective embassies or relevant ministries and do not use their services; 2. Departing migrants may not signal their leave to the embassy, and will remain on the embassy's records, or do not register their return to their country, their migration to a third country, etc., to their origin country; 3. Overestimating the size of a country's community serves political and advocacy purposes. Moreover, the source's total numbers of foreign migrants for 2019 seemed to us overestimated (2,977,000), when compared to our data in Table 7 (2,500,000). Source's details: see Annexed Table 8 and footnote 52).

53 See footnote 49.

54 Estimates of Qatar population by country of citizenship released for 2019 (Population of Qatar by nationality - 2019 report, Priya DSouza Consultancy, 2019 http://priyadsouza.com/population-of-qatar-by-nationality-in-2017/) suggest that African migrants would number around 97,000 for the period 2015-2019 (author's calculation from the source). Ethiopians were estimated to number 25,000 and Kenyans 30,000. The same reservation on these estimates applies, than for Egyptians (see footnote 49).

55 CSO. Migration statistics, 2020 (residency permits statistics).

56 No data on workers disaggregated by region or country of citizenship is available on Qatar and the UAE as of September 2021.

57 All sectors, including the domestic sector.

58 Comprehensive data (all sectors), disaggregated by sex for a significant number of single nationalities only exist for

Bahrain.

59 https://gulfmigration.grc.net/oman-population-by-country-of-citizenship-selected-nationalities-and-sex-2018/

60 This table refers to international migrants as a whole (workers+other categories of migrants). No other data disaggregated by sex and country of citizenship was available for Oman.

61 CSO. Migration data, 2020. In Kuwait, the number of the residency permit indicates the purpose of migration (work, family reunion, etc.), and the sector or employment (private, domestic, …). Permits n°20 are for domestic workers.

62 Labour permits data in Ministry of Labour, Statistical Yearbooks.

63 On Ethiopians: Ethiopia's MoLSA's officials and several sample surveys conducted in the 2010s on Ethiopian migrants show that between 60 and 70 percent of Ethiopians in Gulf countries had migrated through irregular channels, which were often perceived as more attractive due to them being less bureaucratic, faster, and cheaper (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) (2014). Blinded by Hope: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Ethiopian Migrants, Mixed Migration Research Series- Explaining People on the Move Study 6. Nairobi: Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/009_blinded_by_hope.pdf; ILO. Labour market assessment – Market trends and opportunities in Ethiopia and the Gulf, Geneva: ILO, 2020, p.3.

64 De Bel-Air, F. "Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Kuwait", GLMM Explanatory Note n°3/ 2019, http://gulfmigration.grc.net/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2019_03.pdf; "Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Oman," GLMM Explanatory Note n° 7/2018, http://gulfmigration.grc.net/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2018_07.pdf.

65 Ethiopians are particularly targeted: 140,000 Ethiopians were deported in 2013 and many more had to leave since 2017 (De Bel-Air, F. Demography, Migration and the Labour Market in Saudi Arabia, GLMM Explanatory Note No. 5/2018 http://gulfmigration.grc.net/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2018_05.pdf).

66 https://gulfmigration.grc.net/non-kuwaiti-population-by-sex-migration-status-and-country-of-citizenship-of-holder-2012/.

67 Malit, F. and Al-Youha, A. "Kenyan Migration to the Gulf Countries: Balancing Economic Interests and Worker Protection", Migration Information Source, May 18, 2016, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/kenyan-migration-gulf-countries-balancing-economic-interests-and-worker-protection.

68 No data on domestic workers is available before 2018.

69 https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/in-jordan-migrants-suffer-the-most-but-are-largely-invisible-during-covid-19.

70 https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Jordan%20Refugee%20Livelihoods%20Dashboard%20June%202021.pdf.

71 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/briefingnote/wcms_749356.pdf.

72 https://www.mei.edu/publications/could-covid-19-push-jordan-edge

73 https://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_743391/lang--en/index.htm.

74 ILO/ FAFO. "Impact of COVID-19 on Syrian refugees and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon", Evidence Brief for Policy, 2020.

75 Born in Kenya or born abroad. Kenyans Abroad are defined as consisting of Persons of Kenyan Origin (PKO) and Non-Resident Kenyans (NRK's). PKO status designates foreign citizens of Kenyan origin or descent. On the other hand, NRK status is for Kenyan citizens holding a Kenyan passport and/or having dual citizenship and residing outside the country whether for employment, business, vocation, education or any other purpose.

76 http://labour.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Kenyans-working-abroad-hit-4-million.pdf.

77 Danish Refugee Council and Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat. Kenya Country Profile, April 2016 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kenyaupdate.pdf.

78 Malit, Jr., F. T., & Al Youha, A. (2016). Labor protection in the Gulf Countries: A comparative analysis of Kenyan governmental dilemmas in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Cornell University, ILR School Working Papers, p. http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/181.

79 https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/04/be-wary-of-agents-saudi-arabia-warns-kenyans/

80 https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/coast/2021-08-19-cs-to-visit-saudi-arabia-over-detention-centres-full-of-kenyans/.

81 The two sources for Qatar and the UAE are unverifiable estimates and were not considered suitable enough to be used in this report. Estimates in the two sources emanate from embassies, which we consider is less reliable than host state's administrative sources used here, for 1. Not all nationals register at or frequent their embassies; 2. Registered expatriates often fail to signal their departure from the host country; 3. Some embassies tend to inflate the numbers of their nationals, for political purposes. Nonetheless, it is possible that some of these embassies received the estimates on their nationals from official bodies of the host state (Ministry of Interior for example).

82 https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/chelugui-discloses-93-deaths-of-kenyan-middle-east-3472002.

83 https://allafrica.com/stories/202104260709.html.

84 https://allafrica.com/stories/202105070040.html.

85 https://www.mfa.go.ke/?p=3547.

86 https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/coast/2021-08-19-cs-to-visit-saudi-arabia-over-detention-centres-full-of-kenyans/.

87 87 https://www.africanews.com/2017/07/26/ethiopia-confirms-30-day-amnesty-extension-for-illegal-migrants-in-saudi/.

88 The 2021 Labour Force and Migration Survey (LFMS) was conducted with the support of IOM, between January 25 and February 25, 2021. The survey sample included 49,919 households in enumeration areas covering the whole territory except the Tigray region, which was not covered in the survey. Of these, 6,584 households were returnee households, interviewed in the specific module on returns from international migration. Data on Ethiopians living abroad was collected from the sample's households in Ethiopia. A last module covered missing migrants. Among the data collected were the socio-demographic characteristics (age, sex, education level) of return migrants, source country of returnees, place to remigrate and digital literacy (use of cell phones, computers…). As of 15 September 2021, only a "Key findings" volume has been released by CSA, which does not comprise the survey's comprehensive questionnaire (https://www.statsethiopia.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Final-2021-LABOUR-FORCE-AND-MIGRATION-SURVEY_Key-finding-Report-.17AUG2021.pdf).

89 This source not used as a source of estimation of foreign migrants in Qatar and the UAE in this report. Most of these estimates emanate from embassies, which we consider is less reliable than host state's administrative sources used here, for 1. Not all nationals register at or frequent their embassies; 2. Registered expatriates often fail to signal their departure from the host country; 3. Some embassies tend to inflate the numbers of their nationals, for political purposes.

90 The campaign included amnesty provisions allowing those in violation of their visa to turn themselves in without penalty and return to their country and/or to apply for legal work visas. However, Ethiopians and Yemenis were deported in proportionally larger numbers than other nationals during 2017's crackdown (https://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/77-of-illegal-expats-in-saudi-arabia-are-yemeni-1.2139937). According to the International Organization Migration, almost 100,000 Ethiopians left forcibly or voluntarily between April and July 2017, the amnesty expiration deadline set for these nationals (https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopian-migrants-report-abuse-during-saudi-arabia-deportations/4182407.html).

91 https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/return-ethiopian-migrants-kingdom-saudi-arabia-5-may-2017-30-june-2021.

92 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-ethiopia-migrants-idUSKCN21V1OT.

93 https://www.iom.int/news/iom-ethiopia-assists-hundreds-returning-covid-19-affected-migrants.

94 https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/19/immigration-detention-saudi-arabia-during-covid-19#_ftn13.

95 https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/01/saudi-arabia-repatriates-hundreds-detained-ethiopians

96 https://allafrica.com/stories/202107180011.html?utm_source=pocket_mylist&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=jordans_king_abdullah_meets_with_biden_at_white_house_monday&utm_term=2021-07-19.

97 https://gulfmigration.grc.net/media/pubs/briefs/GLMM%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20No.%201%20-%202015%20-%20Gulf%20Irregular%20Migration%20-%20Final.pdf.

98 S. Irudaya Rajan (2020). Migrants at a crossroads: COVID-19 and challenges to migration, Migration and Development, 9:3, 323-330, DOI: 10.1080/21632324.2020.1826201.

**Annexed Table 1. Total population and percentage of nationals and non-nationals in GCC countries (national statistics, 2019)**

| Country | Total population | Nationals | Foreign nationals | % nationals | % non-nationals |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Bahrain** | **1,483,756** | 701,827 | 781,929 | **47.3** | **52.7** |
| **Kuwait** | **4,699,023** | 1,417,579 | 3,281,444 | **30.2** | **69.8** |
| **Oman** | **4,617,927** | 2,655,144 | 1,962,783 | **57.5** | **42.5** |
| **Qatar** | **2,799,202** | 331,651* | 2,467,551* | **11.8**** | **88.2**** |
| **Saudi Arabia** | **34,218,169** | 21,103,198 | 13,114,971 | **61.7** | **38.3** |
| **UAE** | **9,503,738** | 1,244,638* | 8,259,100* | **13.1**** | **86.9**** |
| **Total** | **57,321,815** | **27,454,037*** | **29,867,778*** | **47.9**** | **52.1**** |

**Source: National institutes of statistics and author's calculations based on data published by National Statistical Institutes (see below)**

* Our estimate, based on data published by National Statistical Institutes (see below).

** Ratio is calculated on the basis of population estimates (see below).

**Sources:**

**(1)** Bahrain Open Data Portal, "Documents" section, Population 2019, https://www.data.gov.bh/en/ResourceCenter

**(2)** Statistics Service System, Kuwait Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI). *Population*, December 2018 and December 2019.
https://www.paci.gov.kw/ (inaccessible from outside Kuwait as of 4 October 2022).
The figures are estimates for mid-2019, obtained the following way: (P(12/2018)+P(12/2019))/2.

**(3)** National Centre for Statistical Information (NCSI). *Population Statistics 2019,* Issue 9, 2020.
https://www.ncsi.gov.om/Elibrary/Pages/LibraryContentView.aspx

**(4)** Disaggregated estimates of the numbers of 1. Qataris and 2. non-Qataris residing in Qatar are not readily available in any published source.
The present figures are **GLMM's estimates**, using:
a. Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, *Population and social statistics 2019*
https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics/Statistical%20Releases/Population/Population/2019/Population_social_1_2019_AE.xls
which gave the total resident population by sex;
b. Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority. *Woman and Man in the State of Qatar-A Statistical Profile,* 2020,
https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics/Statistical%20Releases/Social/GenrealSocialStatistics/MenWomenProfile/2020/Woman_Man_2020_EN.pdf
which gave the percentage distribution of population by sex and broad age group for each nationality
(Qataris and non-Qataris) by mid-2019
c. The Labour Force Survey for the second quarter of 2019
https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics/Statistical%20Releases/Social/LaborForce/2019/Q2/LF_Q2_2019_AE.xlsx
which gave the numbers of Qataris and foreigners aged 15 and above by sex, for Q2 2020.
The figure for the total Qatari population obtained (Qataris aged 15 and above from Labour Force Survey Q2 2019+Qataris aged 0 to 14 years estimated from source b.) was then substracted from the total population to obtain the figure of foreign residents.

**(5)** Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority. *Annual Statistics 2019*, table 38. Population estimates by the General Authority for Statistics (GAStat), based on the results of the Population Censuses (1974, 1992, 2004, 2010), on the Demographic Research Bulletin 2016 (2013-2017), and on administrative records: vital statistics records (births and deaths records) and im/emigration records (General Authority for Statistics).
https://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/EconomicReports/pages/yearlystatistics.aspx

**(6)** Figures of UAE resident population disaggregated by nationality Emiratis/non-Emiratis) are unavailable in published sources.
The table's figures are **GLMM's estimates**, using:
a. Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Center (FCSC). Figures of total (non-disaggregated) population for mid-years 2010 to 2019;
https://fcsc.gov.ae/en-us/Pages/Statistics/Statistics-by-Subject.aspx#/%3Fyear=&folder=Demography%20and%20Social/Population/Population&subject=Demography%20and%20Social.
UAE population figures include residents (one year and more, holding a UAE ID card), and seasonal workers, present for less than one year
See methodology in:
https://fcsc.gov.ae/_layouts/download.aspx?SourceUrl=%2Fen-us%2FLists%2FD_StatisticsSubjectV2%2FAttachments%2F1390%2FSP-15%20Methodology%20for%20Population%20Statistics.pdf
b. Post-census 2005 disaggregated estimates of Emirati and non-Emirati populations, published for 2006-2009 (end of year) and 2010 (mid-year)
(publication no longer available as of September 2022)
http://original.fcsa.gov.ae/EnglishHome/ReportDetailsEnglish/tabid/121/Default.aspx?ItemId=1914&PTID=104&MenuId=1
c. Disaggregated figures of births and deaths (end of year figures), for the years 2009 to 2019
https://fcsc.gov.ae/en-us/Pages/Statistics/Statistics-by-Subject.aspx#/%3Ffolder=Demography%20and%20Social/Vital%20Statistics/Births%20and%20Deaths&subject=Demography%20and%20Social
The size of the Emirati population was then estimated for the period (mid-2010-mid-2019), using Emirati populations' natural increase only (births-deaths), recalculated for the reference period of the middle of each year.
The Emirati population estimates obtained for mid-2011 to mid-2019, therefore, do not take into account Emirati citizens' net migration, and possible naturalisations. These are assumed to be only a few.
Estimates of non-Emirati residents were obtained by subtracting estimates of Emirati citizens from figures of total population.

**Annexed Table 2. Total foreign populations in the six GCC states and Jordan (mid-year figures, 2000-2021).**

| | Bahrain | Kuwait* | Oman | Qatar (total population) | Saudi Arabia | UAE** (total population) | Jordan* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2000** | 239,361 | 1,375,468 | 623,571 | 613,969 | 5,571,093 | | |
| **2001** | 251,702 | 1,438,819 | 651,563 | 643,364 | 5,703,704 | | |
| **2002** | 283,308 | 1,521,643 | 668,162 | 676,498 | 5,839,481 | | |
| **2003** | 318,885 | 1,618,998 | 559,257 | 713,859 | 5,978,502 | | |
| **2004** | 358,935 | 1,797,422 | 612,645 | 798,059 | 6,119,899 | | |
| **2005** | 404,018 | 1,998,972 | 666,153 | 906,123 | 6,475,427 | | |
| **2006** | 454,751 | 2,159,644 | 693,486 | 1,042,947 | 6,851,709 | | |
| **2007** | 511,864 | 2,345,039 | 820,802 | 1,218,250 | 7,249,962 | | |
| **2008** | 561,909 | 2,354,261 | 900,248 | 1,448,479 | 7,671,475 | | |
| **2009** | 620,404 | 2,365,970 | 1,156,358 | 1,638,626 | 8,117,611 | | |
| **2010** | 657,856 | 2,433,691 | 816,143 | 1,715,098 | 8,589,817 | 8,264,070 | |
| **2011** | 610,332 | 2,514,107 | 1,530,437 | 1,732,717 | 8,970,670 | 8,394,019 | |
| **2012** | 609,335 | 2,611,292 | 1,530,437 | 1,832,903 | 9,357,447 | 8,526,425 | 1,250,000 |
| **2013** | 638,361 | 2,722,645 | 1,683,204 | 2,003,700 | 10,170,377 | 8,661,345 | 1,800,000 |
| **2014** | 683,818 | 2,816,136 | 1,732,188 | 2,216,180 | 10,684,405 | 8,798,841 | 2,350,000 |
| **2015** | 722,487 | 2,931,401 | 1,814,156 | 2,437,790 | 11,198,097 | 8,938,974 | 2,918,000 |
| **2016** | 759,019 | 3,073,431 | 1,986,226 | 2,617,634 | 11,705,998 | 9,121,167 | 3,001,000 |
| **2017** | 823,610 | 3,130,463 | 2,054,594 | 2,724,606 | 12,185,270 | 9,304,277 | 3,077,000 |
| **2018** | 813,377 | 3,218,525 | 2,013,523 | 2,760,170 | 12,645,033 | 9,366,828 | 3,171,000 |
| **2019** | 781,929 | 3,344,362 | 1,962,815 | 2,799,202 | 13,114,971 | 9,503,738 | 3,323,000 |
| **2020** | 758,941 | 3,210,743 | 1,858,516 | 2,833,679 | 13,583,286 | 9,282,410 | 3,328,000 |
| **2021** | 785,032 | 2,897,001 | 1,712,565 | 2,748,162 | 12,420,173 | NA | 3,483,725 |

*: end of year figures

**: reference period unavailable.

**Sources:** Bahrain: Information and EGovernment Authority (IGA), Bahrain Open Data Portal, "Documents" section; Kuwait: Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI) website, "statistics" section; Oman: National Center for Statistics and Information (NCSI), data portal (2000-2020) and NCSI's homepage, population clock (30 June 2021); Qatar: Planning and Statistics Authority (PSA), *Statistical Yearbooks* , "Population" section (data on Qatar are for the total population (Qataris+non-Qataris)); Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA), *Yearly Statistics 2020* ; UAE: Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Centre (FCSC), "Population" section (data for UAE are for the total resident population (Emiratis+foreign residents)); Jordan: Ministry of Labor, *National Labor Market Figures* .

**Annexed Table 3: Number of employed foreign workers in selected GCC countries (All sectors, Q4 2017 to Q4 2020)**

| | Bahrain | Kuwait | Oman | Saudi Arabia |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2017** | 604,697 | 2,346,664 | 1,854,880 | 10,417,295 |
| **2018** | 603,232 | 2,430,306 | 1,787,447 | 9,429,419 |
| **2019** | 592,233 | 2,470,068 | 1,712,798 | 10,220,703 |
| **2020** | 535,088 | 2,255,109 | 1,443,128 | 10,066,500 |

**Sources**: Bahrain: Expatriate Management System (LMRA-EMS), General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), Pension Fund Commission (PFC), and Civil Service Bureau (CSB) monthly data files to LMRA;
Kuwait: Integrated Database, Labour Market Information System, Central Statistical Bureau (CSB);
Oman: Royal Oman Police in Monthly Statistical Bulletins; Saudi Arabia: General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (MHRSD), National Information Center (NIC), in Labour Force Surveys.
The public sector includes those subject to civil service regulations and government employees subject to insurance regulations (GOSI).
Data are for Q4 of every year.

**Annexed Table 4: Number of employed foreign workers in selected GCC countries (Private sector, Q4 2015 to Q4 2020)**

| | Bahrain | Kuwait | Oman | Arabie Saoudite |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2015** | 445,374 | 1,410,010 | 1,373,842 | 8,416,681 |
| **2016** | 509,062 | 1,509,087 | 1,504,936 | 8,492,965 |
| **2017** | 495,912 | 1,566,782 | 1,502,808 | 7,928,287 |
| **2018** | 503,006 | 1,625,589 | 1,435,153 | 6,896,632 |
| **2019** | 498,999 | 1,640,830 | 1,363,955 | 6,536,072 |
| **2020** | 460,022 | 1,494,133 | 1,148,207 | 6,280,156 |

**Sources**: Bahrain: Expatriate Management System (LMRA-EMS), General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), Pension Fund Commission (PFC), and Civil Service Bureau (CSB) monthly data files to LMRA;
Kuwait: Integrated Database, Labour Market Information System, Central Statistical Bureau (CSB);
Oman: Royal Oman Police in Monthly Statistical Bulletins; Saudi Arabia: General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (MHRSD), National Information Center (NIC), in Labour Force Surveys.
The public sector includes those subject to civil service regulations and government employees subject to insurance regulations (GOSI).
Data are for Q4 of every year.

**Annexed Table 5: Foreign workers in the private sector by economic activity (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Q4 2019-2020)**

| | Kuwait | | Saudi Arabia* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Q4 2019** | **Q4 2020** | **Q4 2019** | **Q4 2020** |
| **Agriculture, forestry & fishing** | 80,023 | 74,828 | 70,347 | 88,974 |
| **Mining & quarrying** | 26,105 | 21,372 | 69,279 | 65,101 |
| **Manufacturing** | 227,508 | 210,421 | 628,843 | 618,508 |
| **Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply** | 801 | 602 | 48,388 | 39,355 |
| **Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities** | 39,984 | 33,808 | 12,629 | 14,722 |
| **Construction** | 165,924 | 127,694 | 1,965,769 | 1,838,375 |
| **Wholesale, retail trade & repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles** | 511,381 | 500,772 | 1,506,579 | 1,454,333 |
| **Transport, Storage** | 88,660 | 79,968 | 183,592 | 190,408 |
| **Accommodation and food service activities** | 100,426 | 93,004 | 326,591 | 342,110 |
| **Information and communications** | 4,329 | 3,586 | 35,393 | 36,198 |
| **Financial and insurance activities** | 12,744 | 12,013 | 12,509 | 12,162 |
| **Real estate activities** | 271,747 | 226,562 | 24,952 | 25,218 |
| **Professional, scientific and technical activities** | 0 | 0 | 101,269 | 91,249 |
| **Administrative and support services activities** | 0 | 0 | 948,404 | 898,379 |
| **Public administration and defence; compulsory social security** | 1,002 | 276 | 54,174 | 68,188 |
| **Education** | 23,906 | 21,793 | 66,737 | 63,320 |
| **Human health and social work activities** | 30,563 | 29,442 | 182,796 | 188,433 |
| **Arts, entertainment and recreation** | 8,954 | 8,494 | 17,545 | 18,470 |
| **Other service activities** | 40,522 | 40,240 | 177,307 | 176,939 |
| **Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of households for own use** | 1 | 1 | 4 | 62 |
| **Activities of extraterritorial organizations and b** | 0 | 0 | 346 | 394 |
| **Not specified** | 6,250 | 9,257 | 49,663 | 122,789 |
| **Total Workers** | **1,640,830** | **1,494,133** | **6,483,116** | **6,353,687** |

*Registered in GOSI records: includes some governmental sector employees

**Sources**: Kuwait: CSO, Integrated Database - LMIS, Q4 2019 and 2020 data;
Saudi Arabia: GOSI data, in GAStat, *Labour Force Survey reports* , Q4 2019 and 2020.

**Annexed Table 6. Oman: Foreign workers in the private and domestic sector by economic activity (December 2019-June 2021)**

| | Dec. 2019 | Dec. 2020 | June 2021 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Agriculture, forestry & fishing** | 60,122 | 80,717 | 82,084 |
| **Mining & quarrying** | 16,891 | 13,804 | 12,939 |
| **Manufacturing** | 197,422 | 173,817 | 169,074 |
| **Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply** | 1,085 | 985 | 949 |
| **Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities** | 5,694 | 5,649 | 4,981 |
| **Construction** | 490,206 | 381,914 | 356,857 |
| **Wholesale, retail trade & repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles** | 235,640 | 205,199 | 203,814 |
| **Transport, Storage** | 67,537 | 59,693 | 60,061 |
| **Accommodation and food service activities** | 121,289 | 102,415 | 100,142 |
| **Information and communications** | 8,024 | 7,371 | 7,654 |
| **Financial and insurance activities** | 3,802 | 3,172 | 2,917 |
| **Real estate activities** | 7,920 | 8,094 | 9,038 |
| **Professional, scientific and technical activities** | 24,104 | 22,026 | 20,479 |
| **Administrative and support services activities** | 76,535 | 65,477 | 64,086 |
| **Education** | 16,313 | 13,869 | 12,764 |
| **Human health and social work activities** | 16,766 | 11,088 | 11,508 |
| **Arts, entertainment and recreation** | 3,948 | 3,137 | 3,205 |
| **Other service activities** | 64,089 | 55,155 | 60,610 |
| **Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of households for own use** | 239,736 | 186,343 | 183,085 |
| **Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies** | 988 | 963 | 833 |
| **Total Workers** | **1,658,111** | **1,400,888** | **1,367,080** |

**Sources**: NCSI, *Monthly Statistical Bulletins* , December 2019, December 2020 and June 2020 data in January 2020, January 2021 and July 2021 issues.

| Annexed Table 6 bis: Oman: Foreign workers in the private and domestic sector by occupation group (December 2019-June 2021) | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Numbers | | | | | Percentages | | |
| | **Dec. 2019** | **Dec. 2020** | **June 2021** | Difference (Dec-2019-June 2021) | % difference | **Dec. 2019** | **Dec. 2020** | **June 2021** |
| **Administration , Directors & Managers** | 37,603 | 31,864 | 30,613 | *-6,990* | *-18.6* | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 |
| **Scientific, Technical & Human Matters Specialists** | 71,940 | 62,124 | 57,471 | *-14,469* | *-20.1* | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.2 |
| **Scientific,Technical & Human Subjects Technicians** | 50,332 | 42,155 | 38,456 | *-11,876* | *-23.6* | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.8 |
| **Clerical Occupations** | 1,802 | 1,286 | 900 | *-902* | *-50.1* | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| **Sales Occupations** | 107,255 | 97,009 | 93,769 | *-13,486* | *-12.6* | 6.5 | 6.9 | 6.9 |
| **Services Occupations** | 481,856 | 416,902 | 410,363 | *-71,493* | *-14.8* | 29.1 | 29.8 | 30.0 |
| **Agriculture, Stock Breeding and Hunting** | 87,378 | 80,461 | 82,260 | *-5,118* | *-5.9* | 5.3 | 5.7 | 6.0 |
| **Industrial , Chemical and Food Industries Occupations** | 117,845 | 99,712 | 99,359 | *-18,486* | *-15.7* | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.3 |
| **Principal and Auxiliary Engineering Occupations** | 702,100 | 569,375 | 553,889 | *-148,211* | *-21.1* | 42.3 | 40.6 | 40.5 |
| **Total Workers** | **1,658,111** | **1,400,888** | **1,367,080** | -291,031 | -17.6 | **100** | **100** | **100** |

**Sources**: NCSI, *Monthly Statistical Bulletins* , December 2019, December 2020 and June 2020 data in January 2020, January 2021 and July 2021 issues.

**Annexed Table 7. Inward migration to the Gulf States and Jordan by region of origin (2018-2019)**

| Region of origin / Country of destination | | Arab Countries* Number | % in total | Africa Number | % in total | Asia Number | % in total | Europe Number | % in total | North America Number | % in total | Other/unknown Number | % in total | TOTAL (2019) (b)(c) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Bahrain** | **(1)(2)** | 149,429 | **19.1** | 5,743 | **0.7** | 572,523 | **73.2** | 4,101 | **0.5** | 1,178 | **0.2** | 49,026 | **6.3** | **782,000 (e)** |
| **Kuwait** | **(2)** | 1,261,062 | **39.2** | 47,227 | **1.5** | 1,868,208 | **58.0** | 18,076 | **0.6** | 20,513 | **0.6** | 3,439 | **0.1** | **3,218,525 (d) (e)** |
| **Oman** | **(1)(2)** | 159,845 | **7.3** | 390 | **0.0** | 2,016,851 | **91.9** | 16,349 | **0.7** | N.A. | **N.A.** | N.A. | **N.A.** | **2,193,435** |
| **Qatar** | **(1)(2)** | 340,584 | **13.6** | 14,338 | **0.6** | 1,828,669 | **73.2** | 8,457 | **0.3** | 4,325 | **0.2** | 302,684 | **12.1** | **2,499,057 (f)** |
| **Saudi Arabia** | **(1)(2)** | 3,378,577 | **25.8** | 160,192 | **1.2** | 9,167,287 | **69.9** | N.A. | **N.A.** | N.A. | **N.A.** | 408,915 | **3.1** | **13,114,971 (e)** |
| **United Arab Emirates** | **(1)(2)** | 1,639,267 | **19.1** | 66,359 | **0.8** | 6,555,424 | **76.3** | 49,744 | **0.6** | 15,390 | **0.2** | 261,072 | **3.0** | **8,587,256** |
| **GCC countries** | | **6,928,764** | **22.8** | **294,249** | **1.0** | **22,008,962** | **72.4** | **96,727** | **0.3** | **41,406** | **0.1** | **1,025,136** | **3.4** | **30,395,244** |
| **Jordan** | **(1)(3)** | 2,346,380 (a) | **94.7** | 655 | **0.0** | 119,970 | **4.8** | 6,072 | **0.2** | 3,069 | **0.1** | 491 | **0.0** | **2,476,637** |

**Sources: in general and unless stated otherwise, estimates are retrieved from receiving countries' statistics.**

(1) United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division (2019). International Migrant Stock 2019 (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019)

(2) national population registers and statistics, in: Gulf Labour Market and Migration database and publications on Gulf countries (http://gulfmigration.org/)

(3) receiving countries' statistics (population censuses, population registers, residency and labour permits records)

(4) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2020). Refugee Data Finder database.

*"Arab countries" refers to the Arab League 22 member states

**A migrant is defined as a resident in a given country who was born outside that country, as a foreigner. The migrant can be still a foreigner in the residence country, or be naturalis**

**Arab countries do not disclose the numbers of expatriates by place of birth and apply the nationality criteria. Therefore, second- and third-generation descendants of migrants, born in their country of residence, cannot be identified in statistics and separated from the "migrants" (first generation, born-abroad immigrants).**
**Figures of migrants in the Gulf states and Jordan thus include an (unknown) share of locally--born foreigners or stateless persons,**
**who do not conform to the definition of "migrant", i.e. a person born abroad as a non-national of his/her current country of residence.**
**Receiving countries' figures usually do not include foreign residents in irregular situation.**
**Data include figures for refugees (registered by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees), in countries where refugees, even born in their country of residence, were not naturalised.**

(a) Includes some 650,000 foreign residents originating from Palestine, figure updated from the Jordanian census of 2015.
This figure was considered more reliable than the figure of the 2.2 milllion Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA in Jordan in 2019, because most of the registered refugees from Palestine are descendants of forced migrants. They are neither migrant (they are born in Jordan), nor foreign nationals (they are Jordanian nationals).
(b) Due to missing data for some destinations countries, and due to the exclusion of migrants in irregular administrative situation from receiving countries' statistics, totals may be underestimated.
(c) Total provides the sum of population numbers at different dates for the period 2018 - 2019. It is not exactly the total population at any of these dates.
(d) Administrative data of residence permit holders, disagregated by region of origin in Kuwaiti statistics (31 December 2018).
(e) Figures of foreign resident population for mid-2019, taken from the country's statistics.
disagregated by nationality (selected nationalities only). The figures do not include the many foreign residents living and working informally.
(f) Author's calculation, using several Qatari statistical sources (https://gulfmigration.org/qatar-population-by-nationality-qatari-non-qatari-at-dates-years-of-census-1970-2015/).

**Annexed Table 8. Estimates of the figures of international migrants (selected nationalities), by country of residence in the GCC (2018-2019)**

| Country of residence / Country of destination (Sources) | Bahrain | Kuwait* | Oman** | Qatar | Saudi Arabia | UAE | Total GCC (est.)*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) (2) | (1) (2) (3) | (1) (2) (4) | (1) (2) (5) | (1) (2) | (1) (2) | |
| **Bangladesh** | 82,518 | 281,131 | 690,407 | 263,086 | 1,246,052 | 1,079,013 | **3,642,207** |
| **India** | 318,547 | 1,012,104 | 748,461 | 698,088 | 2,440,489 | 3,419,875 | **8,637,564** |
| **Pakistan** | 78,638 | 109,427 | 257,105 | 90,000 | 1,447,071 | 981,536 | **2,963,777** |
| **Philippines** | 50,585 | 213,989 | 49,243 | 200,000 | 628,894 | 556,407 | **1,699,118** |
| **Sri Lanka** | 10,358 | 93,749 | 23,063 | 100,000 | 516,256 | 118,708 | **862,134** |
| **Total Asians (est.)*** ** | **572,523** | **1,868,208** | **2,016,851** | **1,828,669** | **9,167,287** | **6,555,424** | **22,008,962** |
| **Egyptians** | 24,569 | 670,524 | 50,431 | 200,000-300,000 | c.1,300,000 | c.400,000 | **2,600,000** |
| **Total foreign nationals** | **782,000** | **3,218,525** | **2,022,470** | **2,499,057** | **13,114,971** | **8,587,256** | **30,224,279** |
| **Total population** | **1,641,172** | **4,621,638** | **4,601,706** | **2,832,067** | **34,268,528** | **9,770,529** | **57,735,640** |

*** figures refer to end of 2018**

**** figures refer to mid-2018**

*****the totals provide the sum of population numbers at different dates. It is not exactly the total population at any of these dates.**

**Sources:** (1) receiving countries' figures, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Programme (GLMM)
https://gulfmigration.org/glmm-database/demographic-and-economic-module/
(2) UN/ DESA. Total migrant stock by origin and destination countries, mid- 2019
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/data/UN_MigrantStockByOriginAndDestination_2019.xlsx
(3) Kuwait Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI) data (administrative records)
https://www.paci.gov.kw/stat/
(4) Oman: National Center for Statistics and Information (NCSI). *Population Statistics* , Issue 8, 2019.
(5) Population of Qatar by nationality - 2019 report, Priya DSouza Consultancy, 2019 http://priyadsouza.com/population-of-qatar-by-nationality-in-2017/

**Annexed Table 9: Migrant workers in the Gulf States and Jordan by sector, region and selected countries of origin* (2020)**

| | Bahrain | | | Kuwait | | | Oman | | Saudi Arabia | | Jordan (2019 data) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Public and private sectors | Domestic sector | % in total | Public and private sectors | Domestic sector | % in total | All sectors | % in total | Public** and private sectors | % in total | Private sector | Domestic sector | % in total |
| Egypt | 4,473 | | *0.9* | 482,146 | | *21.4* | 30,961 | *2.1* | 728,551 | *11.1* | 158,146 | 14,126 | *49.4* |
| Jordan | 3,022 | | *0.6* | 25,653 | | *1.1* | | *0.0* | | *0.0* | | | *0.0* |
| Syria | 1,231 | | *0.2* | 62,306 | | *2.8* | | *0.0* | | *0.0* | 39,109 | 64 | *11.2* |
| **Arab countries** | **13,483** | **0** | 2.6 | **625,853** | **0** | 27.8 | **30,961** | 2.1 | **2,020,772** | 30.8 | **205,878** | **14,305** | 63.1 |
| India | 209,119 | 16,997 | *44.2* | 499,435 | 319,333 | *36.3* | 492,303 | *34.1* | 1,345,216 | *20.5* | 19,440 | 55 | *5.6* |
| Bangladesh | 100,543 | 8,304 | *21.3* | 171,413 | 81,426 | *11.2* | 553,963 | *38.4* | 1,214,264 | *18.5* | 36,209 | 13,792 | *14.3* |
| Pakistan | 42,769 | 2,722 | *8.9* | 73,559 | 1,665 | *3.3* | 180,629 | *12.5* | 1,008,154 | *15.4* | 3,390 | 29 | *1.0* |
| Philippines | 27,555 | 16,582 | *8.6* | 70,653 | 142,544 | *9.5* | 44,097 | *3.1* | 335,268 | *5.1* | 1,574 | 16,274 | *5.1* |
| Sri Lanka | 3,606 | 2,973 | *1.3* | | 77,265 | *3.4* | 20,717 | *1.4* | 41,744 | *0.6* | 7,979 | 1,895 | *2.8* |
| Indonesia | 526 | 4,636 | *1.0* | | 2,599 | *0.1* | | *0.0* | 72,822 | *1.1* | 72 | 529 | *0.2* |
| Nepal | 16,061 | | *3.1* | 47,472 | 14,424 | *2.7* | 14,025 | *1.0* | 253,902 | *3.9* | | | *0.0* |
| **Asia** | **405,203** | **52,214** | 89.4 | **931,797** | **639,256** | 69.7 | **1,305,734** | 90.5 | **4,411,551** | 67.3 | **80,325** | **32,577** | 32.4 |
| Ethiopia | 4 | 10,837 | *2.1* | | 14,785 | *0.7* | | *0.0* | 18,921 | *0.3* | | | *0.0* |
| Kenya | 6 | 4,353 | *0.9* | | | *0.0* | | *0.0* | 7,934 | *0.1* | | | *0.0* |
| Tanzania | 48 | | *0.0* | | | *0.0* | 13,555 | *0.9* | 514 | *0.0* | | | *0.0* |
| Uganda | | | *0.0* | | | *0.0* | 11,098 | *0.8* | 9,972 | *0.2* | | | *0.0* |
| **Sub-Sah. Africa** | **93** | **15,190** | 3.0 | **10,112** | **14,785** | 1.1 | **24,653** | 1.7 | **88,530** | 1.4 | **375** | **13,511** | 4.0 |
| **Europe** | **4,778** | | 0.9 | **6,858** | | 0.3 | | 0.0 | **16,010** | 0.2 | **1,172** | **3** | 0.3 |
| **Americas** | **1,546** | | 0.3 | **8,844** | | 0.4 | | 0.0 | **12,303** | 0.2 | **421** | **1** | 0.1 |
| **Oceania** | **323** | | 0.1 | **592** | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | **1,156** | 0.0 | | | 0.0 |
| **Other/ not stated** | 16,456 | 2,470 | *3.7* | 2,438 | 14,574 | *0.8* | 81,780 | *5.7* | 81 | *0.0* | 167 | 1 | *0.0* |
| **Total foreign workers** | **441,882** | **69,874** | 100.0 | **1,586,494** | **668,615** | 100.0 | **1,443,128** | 100.0 | **6,550,403** | 100.0 | **288,338** | **60,398** | 100.0 |

*Intermediate totals by groups of countries of origin are author's calculations, based on the addition of individual nationalities' figures available for the public and the private sectors. Domestic workers' figures by country of citizenship are published for selected nationalities only. Therefore, figures of domestic workers by group of countries of origin are underestimated, since not all nationalities are listed.

**Sources: Bahrain**: Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), based on data from Bahrain Labour Market Indicators website http://blmi.lmra.bh/2020/12/mi_data.xml; **Oman**: NCSI, Bulletin of Monthly Statistics; **Jordan**: Ministry of Labor, National Labour Market Figures 2019; **Kuwait**: Integrated Database - LMIS; **Saudi Arabia**: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (MHRSD), in Saudi government Open Data Portal, Labor data, datasets: "Manpower in the Public sector during year 2020" (individual data) and "Statistics of establishments and workers in the private sector for the year 2020". Figures of domestic workers were unavailable. Datasets are in Arabic only. No metadata available. https://data.gov.sa/Data/en/organization/hrsdgov?page=2.
** Despite the dataset's title, when compared to the results of GAStat Labour Force Survey (LFS) for Q4 of 2020, the totals of foreign workers in the "public" sector (48,448) were closer to the LFS's figures of foreign workers in the Civil Service (48,874), than to the figures of foreign workers in the government sector (122,416).
It is thus likely that MHRSD's figures of workers in the "Public" sector are referring to Civil service workers. Foreign workers subscribing to the Social Insurance (GOSI) and working for the public sector may not be included in the figure of foreign workers in the public sector (around 73,000 workers according to LFS Q4 2020)

End of year data (Q4 or December data). Saudi Arabia: n.d.

**Annexed Table 10. Bahrain: Number of workers by country of citizenship, sector and sex (Q4-December 2020)**

| | Public sector | | | Private sector | | | Domestic sector | | | % | % in total | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Male | Female | Total | Male | Female | Total | Male | Female | Total | female | Male | Female | Total |
| Algeria | 10 | 4 | 14 | | | | | | | 29 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Egypt | 3,146 | 1,327 | 4,473 | | | | | | | 30 | 0.7 | 1.5 | 0.9 |
| Iraq | 25 | 14 | 39 | 292 | 70 | 362 | | | | 21 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Jordan | 819 | 316 | 1,135 | 1,657 | 230 | 1,887 | | | | 18 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Kuwait | | 11 | 11 | 14 | 10 | 24 | | | | 60 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Lebanon | 25 | 9 | 34 | 667 | 195 | 862 | | | | 23 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Libya | 7 | 2 | 9 | | | | | | | 22 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Mauritania | | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Morocco | 157 | 12 | 169 | | | | | | | 7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Oman | 36 | 7 | 43 | 78 | 27 | 105 | | | | 23 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Qatar | | 13 | 13 | 4 | 2 | 6 | | | | 79 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Saudi Arabia | 134 | 47 | 181 | 215 | 144 | 359 | | | | 35 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Sudan | 90 | 29 | 119 | | | | | | | 24 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 57 | 20 | 77 | 1,045 | 109 | 1,154 | | | | 10 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| Tunisia | 131 | 61 | 192 | | | | | | | 32 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| United Arab Emirates | 1 | 10 | 11 | 4 | 4 | 8 | | | | 74 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| West bank and Gaza | 38 | 15 | 53 | 170 | 30 | 200 | | | | 18 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Yemen, Rep. of | 35 | 6 | 41 | 1,874 | 27 | 1,901 | | | | 2 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.4 |
| **Arab countries** | **4,711** | **1,904** | **6,615** | **6,020** | **848** | **6,868** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 2.6 |
| Afghanistan | 5 | 1 | 6 | 13 | | 13 | | | | 5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Azerbaijan | | | | 13 | 6 | 19 | | | | 32 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Bangladesh | 1,341 | 6 | 1,347 | 98,991 | 205 | 99,196 | 7,556 | 748 | 8,304 | 1 | 25.6 | 1.1 | 21.3 |
| Bhutan | | | | 67 | 99 | 166 | | | | 60 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Brunei Darussalam | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Cambodia | | | | 2 | 5 | 7 | | | | 71 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| China | | 9 | 9 | 1,139 | 196 | 1,335 | | | | 15 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Hong Kong | 6 | | 6 | 2 | 1 | 3 | | | | 11 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| India | 4,286 | 3,366 | 7,652 | 192,193 | 9,274 | 201,467 | 8,687 | 8,310 | 16,997 | 9 | 48.7 | 23.2 | 44.2 |
| Indonesia | 7 | 6 | 13 | 239 | 274 | 513 | 46 | 4,590 | 4,636 | 94 | 0.1 | 5.4 | 1.0 |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. of | 59 | 20 | 79 | 122 | 8 | 130 | | | | 13 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Japan | 4 | | 4 | 62 | 3 | 65 | | | | 4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Kazakhstan | | | | 4 | 11 | 15 | | | | 73 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Korea, Dem. PR | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | | 3 | | | | 20 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Korea, Republic of | | | | 87 | 43 | 130 | | | | 33 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Kyrgyzstan | | | | 8 | 22 | 30 | | | | 73 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Laos | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Malaysia | 39 | 67 | 106 | 90 | 32 | 122 | | | | 43 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Maldives | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Mongolia | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Myanmar | | | | 83 | 70 | 153 | | | | 46 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Nepal | 82 | 11 | 93 | 14,414 | 1,554 | 15,968 | | | | 10 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 3.1 |
| Pakistan | 894 | 37 | 931 | 41,129 | 709 | 41,838 | 2,638 | 84 | 2,722 | 2 | 10.6 | 0.9 | 8.9 |
| Philippines | 747 | 525 | 1,272 | 11,578 | 14,705 | 26,283 | 477 | 16,105 | 16,582 | 71 | 3.0 | 34.7 | 8.6 |
| Seychelles | 2 | 2 | 4 | | | | | | | 50 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Singapore | 4 | 3 | 7 | 25 | 7 | 32 | | | | 26 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Sri Lanka | 74 | 6 | 80 | 3,052 | 474 | 3,526 | 360 | 2,613 | 2,973 | 47 | 0.8 | 3.4 | 1.3 |
| Taiwan, China | 2 | | 2 | 4 | | 4 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Tajikistan | | | | 2 | | 2 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Thailand | 10 | | 10 | 495 | 927 | 1,422 | | | | 65 | 0.1 | 1.0 | 0.3 |
| Turkey | 16 | 15 | 31 | 934 | 47 | 981 | | | | 6 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| Turkmenistan | | | | 2 | 5 | 7 | | | | 71 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Uzbekistan | 1 | | 1 | 29 | 22 | 51 | | | | 42 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Viet Nam | | | | 45 | 18 | 63 | | | | 29 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| **Asia** | **7,580** | **4,075** | **11,655** | **364,829** | **28,719** | **393,548** | **19,764** | **32,450** | **52,214** | 14 | 93.0 | 72.3 | 89.4 |
| Ethiopia | 3 | 1 | 4 | | | | 37 | 10,800 | 10,837 | 100 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 2.1 |
| Kenya | 6 | | 6 | | | | 34 | 4,319 | 4,353 | 99 | 0.0 | 4.8 | 0.9 |
| Nigeria | 18 | 1 | 19 | | | | | | | 5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Somalia | 11 | 2 | 13 | | | | | | | 15 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| South Africa | 1 | 2 | 3 | | | | | | | 67 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Tanzania | 42 | 6 | 48 | | | | | | | 13 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| **Africa** | **81** | **12** | **93** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **71** | **15,119** | **15,190** | 99 | 0.0 | 16.8 | 3.0 |
| Albania | | | | 20 | 26 | 46 | | | | 57 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Armenia | | | | 3 | 4 | 7 | | | | 57 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Austria | 3 | 4 | 7 | 20 | 4 | 24 | | | | 26 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Belarus | | | | 9 | 43 | 52 | | | | 83 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Belgium | 3 | 1 | 4 | 39 | 13 | 52 | | | | 25 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Bosnia and Herz. | | | | 5 | 4 | 9 | | | | 44 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Bulgaria | 142 | 1 | 143 | 27 | 20 | 47 | | | | 11 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Croatia | | | | 15 | 8 | 23 | | | | 35 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Cyprus | 7 | | 7 | 33 | 2 | 35 | | | | 5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |

**Annexed Table 10. Bahrain: Number of workers by country of citizenship, sector and sex (Q4-December 2020) (Cont'd)**

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Czech Republic | | 2 | 2 | 6 | 14 | 20 | | | | 73 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Denmark | 1 | | 1 | 23 | 4 | 27 | | | | 14 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Estonia | | | | 2 | 5 | 7 | | | | 71 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Finland | 3 | | 3 | 3 | | 3 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| France | 14 | 6 | 20 | 255 | 86 | 341 | | | | 25 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Georgia | | | | 3 | 1 | 4 | | | | 25 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Germany | 3 | 2 | 5 | 123 | 29 | 152 | | | | 20 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Greece | 10 | 1 | 11 | 73 | 20 | 93 | | | | 20 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hungary | | | | 11 | 6 | 17 | | | | 35 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Iceland | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Ireland | 16 | 5 | 21 | 146 | 79 | 225 | | | | 34 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Italy | 6 | | 6 | 181 | 27 | 208 | | | | 13 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Latvia | | | | 4 | 3 | 7 | | | | 43 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Lithuania | | | | 4 | 9 | 13 | | | | 69 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Luxembourg | | | | | 2 | 2 | | | | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Malta | | | | 3 | | 3 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Moldova, Rep. of | | | | 3 | 10 | 13 | | | | 77 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Netherlands | 3 | 1 | 4 | 65 | 13 | 78 | | | | 17 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Norway | | | | 8 | | 8 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Poland | 1 | 2 | 3 | 36 | 32 | 68 | | | | 48 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Portugal | 2 | 2 | 4 | 49 | 11 | 60 | | | | 20 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Romania | 1 | 8 | 9 | 45 | 73 | 118 | | | | 64 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Russian Federation | | | | 57 | 87 | 144 | | | | 60 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Serbia and Mont. | | | | 4 | 2 | 6 | | | | 33 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Slovakia | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 21 | 28 | | | | 73 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Slovenia | | | | 2 | | 2 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Spain | 3 | 2 | 5 | 84 | 22 | 106 | | | | 22 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Sweden | 5 | 1 | 6 | 42 | 38 | 80 | | | | 45 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Switzerland | 31 | 4 | 35 | 56 | 23 | 79 | | | | 24 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Ukraine | 1 | | 1 | 29 | 101 | 130 | | | | 77 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| United Kingdom | 120 | 62 | 182 | 1,422 | 537 | 1,959 | | | | 28 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.4 |
| **Europe** | **376** | **105** | **481** | **2,918** | **1,379** | **4,297** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **31** | **0.8** | **1.6** | **0.9** |
| Argentina | | | | 9 | 5 | 14 | | | | 36 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Bahamas | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Bolivia | | | | 4 | 1 | 5 | | | | 20 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Brazil | 3 | 2 | 5 | 52 | 33 | 85 | | | | 39 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Canada | 38 | 22 | 60 | 241 | 72 | 313 | | | | 25 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Cayman Islands | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Chile | | | | 5 | 1 | 6 | | | | 17 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Colombia | | | | 31 | 15 | 46 | | | | 33 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Costa Rica | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Cuba | | | | 1 | 8 | 9 | | | | 89 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Dominica | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | | | | 50 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Dominican Republic | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Ecuador | | | | 2 | 4 | 6 | | | | 67 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| El Salvador | 3 | | 3 | 2 | | 2 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Guatemala | | | | 4 | | 4 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Haiti | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Honduras | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Jamaica | | | | 4 | 4 | 8 | | | | 50 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Mexico | | | | 28 | 12 | 40 | | | | 30 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Nicaragua | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | | | | 50 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Panama | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Paraguay | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Peru | | | | 14 | 4 | 18 | | | | 22 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Saint Lucia | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Suriname | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | | | | 5 | 1 | 6 | | | | 17 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| United States | 42 | 23 | 65 | 579 | 193 | 772 | | | | 26 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Venezuela | | | | 49 | 16 | 65 | | | | 25 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| **Americas** | **86** | **47** | **133** | **1,036** | **377** | **1,413** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **27** | **0.3** | **0.5** | **0.3** |
| Australia | 22 | 6 | 28 | 138 | 46 | 184 | | | | 25 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| New Zealand | 28 | 8 | 36 | 53 | 19 | 72 | | | | 25 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Kiribati | | | | 2 | | 2 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Papua New Guinea | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| **Oceania** | **50** | **14** | **64** | **194** | **65** | **259** | 0 | 0 | **0** | **24** | **0.1** | **0.1** | **0.1** |
| **Other world** | 60 | 46 | **106** | | | | 944 | 1,526 | **2,470** | **61** | **0.2** | **1.7** | **0.5** |
| **Not specified** | 6 | 4 | **10** | 12,813 | 3,527 | **16,340** | | | | **22** | **3.0** | **3.9** | **3.2** |
| **Total** | **12,950** | **6,207** | **19,157** | **387,810** | **34,915** | **422,725** | **20,779** | **49,095** | **69,874** | **18** | **100.0** | **100.0** | **100.0** |

**Source: Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), Kingdom of Bahrain, based on data from Bahrain Labour Market Indicators website**
http://blmi.lmra.bh/2020/12/mi_data.xml
Public sector: Pension Fund Commission (PFC) monthly data files to LMRA; Private sector: General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI) monthly data files to LMRA; Domestic sector: LMRA Domestic Workers System (DMS) (includes Active domestic work permits for which an residence permit has been issued)
Only major countries of origin of domestic workers are listed. Therefore, no country- or region-level totals were calculated.

## About the author



**Françoise De Bel-Air** (Ph.D.) is a researcher and consultant based in Paris, France. A socio-demographer by training, she specializes in the demography of Arab countries, especially in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Currently a Senior Fellow at the Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (GLMM) programme of the Gulf Research Center Foundation (GRCF, Geneva) since 2013, she was a Senior Fellow at the French Institute for the Near East (IFPO) in Amman, Jordan for several years, and a part-time Professor at the Migration Policy Centre (MPC), European University Institute (EUI), Florence, Italy. Her research focusses on political demography, as well as on the demographic and socio-political dynamics in the region: youth, family structures, labour and forced migration, migration, and population policies. She published two edited volumes and over fifty book chapters, scientific articles, and research papers on population issues in the Arab region. Her recent publications on migration and Gulf states include "Asian Migrants in the Gulf", in Shah. N. (Ed). *Covid-19 Crisis and Asian Migration*, Lahore: Lahore School of Economics, 2021; *The Socio-Economic Impact of Covid-19 and Low Oil Prices on Migrants and Remittances in the Arab Region* (with B. Nilsson), UNDP-RBAS Research Papers, 2021; "Youth Unemployment and Alienation in the Middle East: A Critical View", in: Salvatore, A.; Hanafi, S. and Obuse, K. (Eds). *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of the Middle East*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2022; and "The Politics of Migration in the Gulf States", in: AlMezaini, Kh. and Alexander; K. (Eds). *Introduction to Gulf Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

f_dba@hotmail.com

https://grc.academia.edu/FrancoiseDeBelAir

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Francoise-De-Bel-Air

**Referencing Publications:** Citations and quotations should always include either the long or the short reference. Generally the long reference should be used. In exceptional cases (e.g., not enough room) the short reference should be used.

**Long reference:** Françoise De Bel-Air, "Measuring the impact of Covid-19 on migrant workers in the GCC and Jordan", Research Report No. 1/2023, Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (GLMM) Programme, https:// https://www.gulfmigration.grc.net.

**Short reference:** F.De Bel-Air, "Measuring the impact of Covid-19 on migrant workers in the GCC and Jordan", Research Report No. 1/2023, GLMM, https:// https://www.gulfmigration.grc.net.

**GLMM mission:** The Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (GLMM) programme is an international independent, non-partisan, non-profit joint programme hosted at a major Gulf think tank. The programme provides data, analyses, and recommendations contributing to the improvement of understanding and management of Gulf labour markets and migration, engaging with and respecting the viewpoints of all stakeholders.

**GLMM activities:** The GLMM has a wide range of activities: Gathering and elaborating data and documents; Researching and analysing key issues; Publishing various types of papers, data, and documents; and Organising panels and workshops.

**GLMM publications:** The GLMM produces an array of publications addressing all major issues in different formats: Explanatory Notes, Research Reports, Factsheets, Policy Briefs, and Volumes.

**Downloading and further information:** This paper and other publications, data, and documents can be downloaded from the GLMM website at: https://gulfmigration.grc. For further information, please send an email to: info.glmm@grc.net.

GLMM

Gulf Labour Markets and Migration

Gulf Research Center

Knowledge for All